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BINARY GOVERNANCE: LESSONS 
FROM THE GDPR’S APPROACH TO 
ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
MARGOT E. KAMINSKI* 
Algorithms are now used to make significant decisions about 
individuals, from credit determinations to hiring and firing. But they are 
largely unregulated under U.S. law. A quickly growing literature has split 
on how to address algorithmic decision-making, with individual rights and 
accountability to nonexpert stakeholders and to the public at the crux of the 
debate. In this Article, I make the case for why both individual rights and 
public- and stakeholder-facing accountability are not just goods in and of 
themselves but crucial components of effective governance. Only individual 
rights can fully address dignitary and justificatory concerns behind calls for 
regulating algorithmic decision-making. And without some form of public 
and stakeholder accountability, collaborative public-private approaches to 
systemic governance of algorithms will fail. 
In this Article, I identify three categories of concern behind calls for 
regulating algorithmic decision-making: dignitary, justificatory, and 
instrumental. Dignitary concerns lead to proposals that we regulate 
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algorithms to protect human dignity and autonomy; justificatory concerns 
caution that we must assess the legitimacy of algorithmic reasoning; and 
instrumental concerns lead to calls for regulation to prevent consequent 
problems such as error and bias. No one regulatory approach can effectively 
address all three. I therefore propose a two-pronged approach to 
algorithmic governance: a system of individual due process rights combined 
with systemic regulation achieved through collaborative governance (the 
use of private-public partnerships). Only through this binary approach can 
we effectively address all three concerns raised by algorithmic decision-
making, or decision-making by Artificial Intelligence (“AI”).  
The interplay between the two approaches will be complex. Sometimes 
the two systems will be complementary, and at other times, they will be in 
tension. The European Union’s (“EU’s”) General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) is one such binary system. I explore the extensive 
collaborative governance aspects of the GDPR and how they interact with 
its individual rights regime. Understanding the GDPR in this way both 
illuminates its strengths and weaknesses and provides a model for how to 
construct a better governance regime for accountable algorithmic, or AI, 
decision-making. It shows, too, that in the absence of public and stakeholder 
accountability, individual rights can have a significant role to play in 
establishing the legitimacy of a collaborative regime. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, fifth-grade teacher Sarah Wysocki was fired by a machine.1 
Wysocki had been a star teacher, receiving rave reviews from both parents 
and her principal. But these positive reviews from humans were outweighed 
by a low score Wysocki received from an algorithm (a computer program), 
and the school district was required by policy to fire her, along with 205 
other teachers. 
When Wysocki and others questioned this outcome and asked how the 
scores were calculated, they were told that the algorithm was too complicated 
for them to understand. Wysocki suspected, however, that the model relied 
heavily on standardized test scores and that due to cheating, over half of her 
students started the school year with artificially inflated exam scores. When 
she tried to make her case to the school district, however, she was told that 
the decision was final.2 
Algorithms—that is, computer programs, including AI—are now used 
to make a host of decisions about human beings that have significant impacts 
on human welfare and dignity.3 Decisions about whether to extend credit, 
whether to hire or fire somebody, how to price discriminate, and what 
 
 1.  CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 11 (2016); Bill Turque, ‘Creative . . . 
Motivating’ and Fired, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/c
reative--motivating-and-fired/2012/02/04/gIQAwzZpvR_story.html. 
 2.  Recently, Houston-area teachers who were similarly fired based on the use of a secret computer 
algorithm successfully argued that their dismissals may have violated their procedural due process rights. 
Houston Federation of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 
1180 (S.D. Tex. 2017). This ruling, however, applies only to government actions and to dismissals during 
the term of a contract or a continuing contract. Id. at 1173–74. Thanks to Mark MacCarthy for identifying 
this case. 
 3.  For more extended descriptions and definitions of decision-making algorithms, see Jessica M. 
Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 67–88 (2017) (discussing the actuarial 
algorithms used in recidivism risk assessment); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What 
Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 658–62 (2017) 
(discussing machine-learning algorithms). 
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educational track to put a student on now can all involve algorithmic 
decision-making, or a heavy reliance on suggestions arrived at by 
algorithms. These decisions, when made by the private sector, go largely 
unregulated in the United States.4 The types of algorithms used can present 
significant challenges to our legal system, as they are often secret, impossible 
to predict, hard to explain to nonexperts, and continuously changing over 
time. 
Earlier calls for algorithmic accountability propose addressing 
algorithmic decision-making through both individual “due process” rights 
and an array of systemic accountability measures.5 The systemic measures 
include public disclosure of source code, agency oversight, expert boards, 
and stakeholder input. More recent literature, however, moves away from 
these proposals, questioning both the value of individual rights and 
stakeholder input by nonexperts and the costs of public disclosure. Public-
facing accountability and individual due process in particular have become 
 
 4.  This is not to say that algorithmic decision-making goes entirely unregulated. There are a 
number of existing laws in the United States that were not written for, but may be applicable to, 
algorithmic decision-making. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development charged 
Facebook in 2019 with allegedly violating the Fair Housing Act, by using machine learning algorithms 
to discriminate in housing advertisements against users based on membership in protected 
classes. Facebook, Inc., FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/HUD_v_Facebook.pdf. As the Obama White House 
noted, however, the use of big data has “the potential to eclipse longstanding civil rights protections in 
how personal information is used in housing, credit, employment, health, education, and the 
marketplace.” JOHN PODESTA ET AL., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA (2014), http://obama 
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_5.1.14_final_print.pdf. For a 
more detailed analysis of the difficulties inherent in applying antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act, to algorithmic decision-making, see Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big 
Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 714–23 (2016) [hereinafter Barocas & Selbst, 
Disparate Impact]. But see James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 
7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE. 164, 170 (2017) (arguing that with judicial adaptations antidiscrimination law 
can address algorithmic decision-making). The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), too, contains due 
process-like and explanatory requirements for credit reporting agencies that apply to the use of 
algorithmic decision-making. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process 
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2014) (discussing the coverage and limitations 
of the FCRA); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1100–05 (2018) [hereinafter Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal] (discussing the 
FCRA and Equal Credit Opportunity Act). In the context of employment decisions where the employer 
is in the public sector, due process rights may also apply. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 5.  I join several scholars in calling for governance of algorithmic decision-making that 
incorporates both individual rights and systemic oversight. Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale 
presciently propose a mix of individual rights with systemic governance, as do Jason Schultz and Kate 
Crawford. These scholars do not, however, characterize their proposed systemic regulation as 
collaborative governance nor discuss at length the interaction between the individual and systemic 
approaches. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 27–32; Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and 
Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 124–28 
(2014). And as other scholars in this space have since pushed back against the efficacy of individual 
rights, it is worth revisiting their value.  
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the straw men of algorithmic accountability: held up as ineffective or even 
harmful, in contrast to the specific tools a particular author or set of authors 
propose in their place. 
In this Article, I make the case for both individual rights and public- 
and stakeholder-facing accountability not just as goods in and of themselves 
but as crucial components of effective governance. I begin by examining the 
reasons behind calls for algorithmic accountability and find that this explains 
the split in the literature over the role of individual rights. Then, unlike earlier 
authors, I draw on regulatory design literature—specifically on collaborative 
governance, or governance through public-private partnerships—to explain 
why both public- and stakeholder-facing accountability are not luxuries but 
necessary tools. 
My claims are both descriptive and normative. As a descriptive matter, 
I identify that many recent calls for systemic approaches to algorithmic 
accountability are in fact calls for collaborative governance. I also identify 
that the EU’s GDPR represents an attempt to use collaborative governance 
towards algorithmic accountability, combined with a system of individual 
rights. 
As a normative matter, I make two claims. First, governing algorithmic 
decision-making should include both individual rights and systemic 
approaches. Recent authors are correct that individual rights are not the best 
way to approach instrumental goals, but should not so readily dismiss 
dignitary and justificatory concerns about algorithmic decision-making. 
These concerns dictate a need for some form of individual process, at least 
when decisions have a significant effect on an individual. But at the same 
time, a systemic approach is necessary to address risks on a system-wide 
level and to target the various stages of development and training when 
algorithms (or really the humans who build them) are more amenable to 
regulation. 
Second, if we are going to use the tools of collaborative governance to 
govern algorithmic decision-making—and there are good reasons, at least on 
paper, to do so—we have to be vigilant about designing a regulatory system 
that is legitimate, immunized from capture, and strong enough that it is 
different in kind from self-regulation. Collaborative governance is described, 
in brief, as a better way to govern fast-changing, risky systems with a high 
degree of technological complexity. There are reasons to think it might be a 
good fit for governing algorithmic decision-making. But effective 
collaborative governance requires both a regulator with real power (for 
example, the GDPR’s famously stringent fines) and what Jody Freeman has 
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called “aggregate accountability”:6 accountability that runs through the 
system as a whole, and accounts not just to a regulator or group of technical 
experts but to representatives of affected stakeholders and to the public. 
Otherwise, the regulatory system will be both less legitimate and less 
effective. It will be less legitimate because of the high risk of capture. And 
it will be less effective because it will fail to deploy those third-party 
resources—from external expertise, to increased enforcement power, to 
naming and shaming, to market feedback, to public input into policy—that 
make collaborative governance appealing to resource-strapped regulators in 
the first place. 
If we fail to design the regulatory system with these inputs and outputs 
in place, then—as I argue in Part III is the case with the GDPR—we may 
find ourselves needing to rely on individual transparency rights to 
accomplish systemic accountability goals. This forms yet another argument 
for putting individual rights into place. That is, if the systemic side of 
governance involves only the government in dialogue with affected parties, 
then third-party stakeholders and members of the public will need to devise 
creative ways of using individualized disclosure about algorithmic decision-
making to ensure the system of governance is not captured and remains 
legitimate. 
This Article proceeds as follows: in Part I, I discuss at length the three 
distinct categories of reasons behind calls for regulating algorithmic 
decision-making. The first is a dignitary rationale, concerned with both 
personhood and autonomy in the face of complex and secret profiling and 
decision-making systems. The second is a justificatory rationale, concerned 
with ensuring that decisions are made based on socially and legally 
acceptable reasoning and are legitimized by acceptable process or oversight. 
The third is an instrumental rationale, advocating regulation to ensure that 
algorithmic decisions are not erroneous, faulty, biased, or outright 
discriminatory. These rationales often overlap, and regulating in the name of 
one will often help address another. But distinguishing them explains both 
why articles on algorithmic decision-making currently speak past each other 
and why a number of recently proposed regulatory solutions are incomplete. 
If governments wish to address all three concerns, they will need to 
adopt a two-pronged, or binary, approach to algorithmic accountability. Part 
II describes this proposed system. The first prong, based on individual due 
process, addresses dignitary and justificatory concerns, but may be less 
 
 6.  Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 664–67 (2000). 
  
2019] BINARY GOVERNANCE 1535 
effective at producing a system-wide, instrumental impact. The second 
prong, a systemic regulatory approach, addresses some systemic justificatory 
concerns, but largely serves the instrumental goals of addressing error, 
unfairness, bias, and discrimination. 
 In Part II, I identify that the systemic governance prong of the 
regulatory system will involve collaborative governance, or “new 
governance”—that is, public-private partnerships in governance.7 This claim 
is, again, both descriptive and normative. It is descriptive in that a number 
of calls for algorithmic accountability in fact already deploy the tools of 
collaborative governance without realizing they are doing so: auditing, 
whistle-blower protection, risk assessments, and more.8 It is normative in 
that collaborative governance—which is not to be confused with self-
regulation or deregulation—has several advantages in these circumstances 
over purely top-down, command-and-control regulation. Collaborative 
governance is generally described as better suited for regulating highly 
complex systems that create hard-to-calculate risks, change too quickly for 
traditional regulatory approaches, and involve technical and industry 
 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 592−664; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 
45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21–33 (1997); Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 65, 66–67 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012) [hereinafter Lobel, New 
Governance]; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 371–76 (2004) [hereinafter Lobel, The Renew 
Deal]. 
 8. Only a handful of scholars have explicitly considered using collaborative governance, in 
sector-specific contexts, to govern algorithmic decision-making or AI. See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-
Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 529–31 
(2016) (“We advocate a collaborative-dynamic regulation . . . .”); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating 
Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 465–71 (2017) (discussing collaborative governance of 
black box, medical algorithms). Sonya Katyal has called for the greater involvement of the private sector 
in algorithmic accountability, pointing to both self-regulation and whistleblower protection, but does not 
situate this approach in the literature of collaborative governance. Sonya K. Katyal, Private 
Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 61 (2019) (“[W]e are looking 
in the wrong place if we look to the state alone to address issues of algorithmic accountability. . . . [I]t 
makes sense to explore opportunities for greater endogeneity in addressing civil rights concerns, 
particularly given the information asymmetry between the industries that design AI and the larger 
public.”). Michael Guihot and others have similarly outlined “this decentering of regulation and . . . 
examples of peer or self-regulation that has begun to proliferate in the vacuum of government control,” 
discussing responsive regulation but noting that in the case of AI no backdrop regulatory framework is 
currently in place. Michael Guihot et al., Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial 
Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 427 (2017). They suggest that a “[r]eally [r]eally 
[r]esponsive [r]isk-[b]ased [r]egulation” might be appropriate, ultimately calling for a mix of self-
regulation and risk regulation in the form of soft-law, regulatory “nudges.” Id. at 441, 445. Alicia Solow-
Niederman has joined this conversation about possible regulatory toolkits and regulatory design, in a 
forthcoming piece. Alicia Solow-Niederman, Administering Artificial Intelligence, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming May 2020). 
  
1536 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1529 
expertise that regulators and legislators are unlikely to have.9 Collaborative 
governance, at least in theory, should be well suited to improving not just 
algorithms but the complex human systems around them.10 It should be 
better suited to addressing solutions towards design and training phases, 
rather than just addressing the running model.11  
 Identifying the use of collaborative governance in establishing 
algorithmic accountability lets us (1) take a thorough and system-wide 
approach to accountability rather than deploy partial solutions; (2) engage 
with existing governance literature and examples rather than attempt to 
reinvent the regulatory wheel; (3) expand the existing algorithmic 
accountability toolkit; and (4) recognize that the accountability problem is in 
fact multilayered. Because regulators will be delegating rulemaking of sorts 
to private parties, we need not just transparency and oversight over the 
algorithm, but second-order transparency and oversight over that rulemaking 
and compliance process.12  
 By characterizing algorithmic accountability as collaborative 
governance, this Article identifies a second-order accountability problem 
that largely has gone ignored. Calls for transparency of algorithmic decision-
making cannot so easily be dismissed by those who focus on instrumental, 
rather than dignitary or justificatory, concerns. Transparency and deeper 
forms of accountability play an essential role not just in protecting human 
dignity but in establishing a legitimate and well-functioning system of 
collaborative governance. 
Part II closes by discussing the interaction between the two parts of this 
proposed binary system: individual process and systemic regulation 
involving collaborative governance. The interaction between these two 
prongs will be complex. At times they will be complementary, and at other 
times their goals and approaches will conflict. 
 
 9. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and 
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 385–92 (2006). 
 10. Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency 
Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973, 983–84 (2018) 
(discussing algorithmic “assemblages” of humans and machines); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 657 
(“Because playing with the data occurs earlier in time and entails much more human involvement than 
the running model, this phase provides more opportunities and behavioral levers for policy 
prescriptions.”). 
 11. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 655–58. 
 12. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 57–60 (1992); Ian Ayres & John 
Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 435, 491 
n.137 (1991); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating AI Risk Through the GDPR 31–32 (June 24, 
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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By way of illustration, Part III of this Article turns to Europe’s GDPR, 
which takes a complex, binary approach to regulating algorithmic decision-
making.13 This Article identifies that the GDPR’s systemic approach to 
governing algorithms relies heavily on collaborative governance. It is the 
first to discuss the GDPR’s approach to algorithmic accountability as a 
binary system that illustrates how an individual rights approach might 
interact with its collaborative governance aspects. Understanding the GDPR 
in this way both illuminates its strengths and weaknesses and provides a 
model for how to construct a better regulatory regime for algorithmic 
decision-making. 
I.  WHY REGULATE ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING? 
A growing body of literature calls for regulating algorithmic decision-
making.14 This Part identifies three categories of concerns behind these calls: 
dignitary (which includes autonomy), justificatory, and instrumental.15 
These categories can overlap, but they also lead to divergent regulatory 
solutions. To understand current divides in the literature, it is necessary to 
understand the three goals motivating calls for algorithmic accountability. 
 
 13. Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU). 
 14. See, e.g., Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 984–85; Lee A. Bygrave, Minding the 
Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated Profiling, 17 COMPUTER L. & 
SECURITY REP. 17, 21–22 (2001); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1301–13 (2008); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 18–28; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 
5, at 109–10; Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 
31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5–6 (2017); Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 427; Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn 
of a Critical Transparency Right for the Profiling Era, in DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT YEARBOOK 2012, at 
41, 49–54 (Jacques Bus et al. eds., 2012); Katyal, supra note 8, at 107–08; Pauline T. Kim, Auditing 
Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 197–202 (2017); Joshua A. Kroll et al., 
Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 696–99 (2017); Isak Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The 
Right Not To Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling, in EU INTERNET LAW 77, 96–97 
(Tatiani-Eleni Synodinou et al. eds., 2017); Price, supra note 8, at 432–37; Neil M. Richards & Jonathan 
H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 408–09 (2014); Matthew U. Scherer, 
Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. 
J.L. TECH. 353, 373–76 (2016); Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The 
Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1374–86 (1992); 
Solow-Niederman, supra note 8; Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 
40 GA. L. REV. 1, 64–78 (2005); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 105–11 
(2017); Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1530–53. 
 15.  Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1117–19 (identifying the three overlapping 
reasons for calls for transparency in the literature as (1) “autonomy, dignity and personhood”; (2) an 
“instrumental value [to] . . . educat[e] the subjects of automated decisions about how to achieve different 
results”; and (3) “the idea that explaining the model will allow people to debate whether the model’s rules 
are justifiable”); see also Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an 
Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 27–43 
(2017) (identifying regulatory reasons as “[d]iscrimination and [u]nfairness,” “[i]nformation[] [p]rivacy,” 
and “[o]pacity and [t]ransparency”). 
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More importantly, to design a regulatory solution that works, we have to 
articulate what we want regulation to accomplish. 
Calls for algorithmic decision-making often start from the premise that 
it replaces something worse: decision-making by humans. Human decision-
making can be deeply, terribly flawed. Human decision makers can be 
outright discriminatory; can hold deep-seated biases about race, gender, or 
class; and can exhibit a host of cognitive biases that invisibly influence 
outcomes.16 The example of “redlining” in which banks denied (and in some 
cases, continue to deny) housing loans to African Americans, Latinos, and 
other minorities exemplifies outright discrimination by human decision 
makers.17 A 2016 study of interview practices by elite law firms evidenced 
bias against candidates on the basis of both social class and gender.18 And 
thanks largely to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, the legal literature 
has become aware of the host of cognitive biases that human decision makers 
have.19 Human decisions are influenced, for example, by anchoring—people 
tend to rely heavily on one piece of information, often the first piece of 
information acquired, rather than equally weight relevant inputs.20 Humans 
are subject to confirmation bias—the tendency to read all information in a 
way that confirms already-held opinions.21 These and other cognitive biases 
suggest that human decision makers, even when not being overtly 
discriminatory, are not impartial or even particularly accurate. 
It is thus tempting to believe that machines will be better. But even 
complex algorithms are simplifications of reality, and these simplifications 
involve human choices along a number of axes.22 As Cathy O’Neil has 
 
 16. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Certainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3, 3−8 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds, 1982); Jon D. Hanson 
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 630, 643–45 (1999); Tamara R. Piety, “Merchants of Discontent”: An Exploration of the 
Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 377, 402–03 (2001) (describing cognitive biases). 
 17. JOHN PODESTA ET AL., supra note 4, at 53 (“‘Redlining,’ in which banks quite literally drew—
and in cases continue to draw—boundaries around neighborhoods where they would not loan money, 
existed for decades as a potent tool of discrimination against African-Americans, Latinos, Asians, and 
Jews.”). 
 18. Lauren A. Rivera & András Tilcsik, Class Advantage, Commitment Penalty: The Gendered 
Effect of Social Class Signals in an Elite Labor Market, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 1097, 1108–11 (2016). 
 19. For further discussion on this topic, see generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra 
note 16.  
 20. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 667–69; Piety, supra note 16, at 403. 
 21. Piety, supra note 16, at 402; see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 647–50. 
 22. O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 20–21; Eaglin, supra note 3, at 63 (describing the “normative 
judgments embedded in actuarial risk assessment tools’ construction”); Katyal, supra note 8, at 67 (“Since 
algorithmic models reflect the design choices of the humans who built them, they carry the biases of the 
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written, algorithms are not neutral: “Models are opinions embedded in 
mathematics.”23 Turning to algorithmic decision-making risks cloaking the 
very things we find problematic in human decision-making under a veneer 
of technical impartiality. And where human decision-making can often be 
contested, algorithmic decision-making, as we saw in the example of teacher 
Wysocki above, is often taken at face value and left unchallenged and 
unchallengeable.24 
Algorithms are, effectively, mathematical models of the real world.25 
Statisticians, or “data scientists,” construct algorithms to take in data and find 
correlations or make predictions. Humans actively design algorithms in a 
number of ways: they pick an algorithm’s objectives, decide what the input 
will be, decide whether to use proxies, decide how to weight the data, decide 
how to clean the data, choose what type of algorithm to use, decide how to 
“validate” the algorithm (check that it is working), and determine how 
reliable the decisions need to be—and, once the model is running, decide 
whether and how to confirm in practice that it is producing correct results. 
Increasingly sophisticated algorithms can create their own rules and produce 
“intuitions” humans do not have.26 But for any kind of algorithm, human 
choices and assumptions go into its construction, training, and oversight—
or lack thereof. 
In some applications—for example, in those used regularly in 
baseball—algorithms work extraordinarily well.27 The clearer and more 
mathematical the objective (“Show me the player who is most likely to hit a 
home run”) the more detailed and direct the data (measurements of actual 
performance rather than proxies for it), the more transparent the inputs and 
code (so that they can be double-checked by others), the more easily 
verifiable the outcomes (home runs hit or not), and the more likely it is that 
an algorithm tracks what you want it to track and produces “fair” or 
 
observer or instrument.”); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 705 n.187 (“[A]t the machine-learning stages 
we consider here, not only do analysts have to consider technical methods for achieving fairness, but they 
have to wrestle with highly normative questions of what kind of fairness matters most in a given 
context.”); see also Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data, 15 INFO., COMM. & 
SOC’Y 662, 667 (2012) (observing that the process of “‘data cleaning’ . . . is inherently subjective”). 
 23. O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 21. 
 24. Citron, supra note 14, at 1271–72 (describing the tendency to defer to machine decisions). 
 25. But see O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 19; Eaglin, supra note 3, at 91; Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 
684. 
 26. Steven Strogatz, One Giant Step for a Chess-Playing Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/science/chess-artificial-intelligence.html (“Most unnerving was 
that AlphaZero seemed to express insight.”). 
 27. O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 17 (“Baseball is an ideal home for predictive mathematical 
modeling.”). 
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“accurate” outputs.28 But when an objective is hard to measure or articulate 
in mathematical terms (“Show me the best teacher”); the data is limited, 
muddy, and filled with proxies (standardized test scores or teacher 
evaluations); the algorithm itself is hidden (whether by technology, policy, 
or law); the results are hard to test or produce a skewing feedback loop (fired 
teachers cannot redeem themselves and, thus, prove that the model was 
wrong); then the risk that an algorithm will produce bad outputs goes up.29 
Thus the dominant rationale for regulating algorithmic decision-making 
is an instrumental (or consequentialist) rationale. We should regulate 
algorithms, this reasoning goes, to prevent the consequences of baked-in bias 
and discrimination and other kinds of error. Algorithmic decision-making 
can be erroneous, based on incorrect facts or derived from incorrect 
inferences.30 Algorithmic decision-making can be biased, reflecting biased 
decisions made by programmers or historic discrimination baked into the 
data sets on which algorithms are trained.31 Algorithmic decision-making 
can be intentionally discriminatory, hiding discriminatory motives behind 
proxy rationales.32 Or, algorithms can work perfectly well but be used for 
bad objectives, such as targeting individuals for exploitative payday loans.33 
Machine learning systems can also crash or function in extraordinarily out-
of-the-box ways compared to human decision-making. 
The instrumental rationale for regulating algorithmic decision-making 
counsels that regulation should try to correct these problems, often by using 
systemic accountability mechanisms, such as ex ante technical requirements, 
audits, or oversight boards, to do so.34 Accountability for individual 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 4–11. 
 30. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 8; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 104; Zarsky, 
supra note 14, at 1506. 
 31. See Barocas & Selbst, Disparate Impact, supra note 4, at 677–94; Citron, supra note 14, at 
1262; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 13–14; see also Joy Buolamwini, How I’m Fighting Bias in 
Algorithms, TED (Nov. 2016), https://www.ted.com/talks/joy_buolamwini_how_i_m_fighting_bias_in_ 
algorithms?language=en. 
 32. Barocas & Selbst, Disparate Impact, supra note 4, at 691–92. 
 33. O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 82–83. 
 34. See, e.g., Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 39 (“[I]f an algorithm was not ‘designed with future 
evaluation and accountability in mind,’ no amount of software testing—even aided by total 
transparency—will always work to elucidate any particular question.” (citation omitted)); Edwards & 
Veale, supra note 15, at 76, 82 (referring to a “structural approach” to accountability; calling for a “focus 
a priori on the creation of better algorithms, as well as creative ways for individuals to be assured about 
algorithmic governance”; and advocating for “creating better systems, with less, opacity, clearer audit 
trails, well and holistically trained designers, and input from concerned publics[, which] seems eminently 
more appealing than” individual transparency (footnote omitted)); see also Kroll et al, supra note 14, at 
659. 
  
2019] BINARY GOVERNANCE 1541 
decisions may have some place in this approach (for example, when experts 
such as lawyers or physicians might need to overrule recommendations made 
by algorithms),35 but scholars driven primarily by instrumental concerns tend 
to discount the value of individualized transparency or process and instead 
emphasize a systemic regulatory approach, for reasons discussed further in 
Part II. 
The other two rationales for regulating algorithmic decision-making, 
however, suggest that systemic oversight is not enough. Both dignitary and 
justificatory reasoning point towards including individual rights. Sometimes 
vague in the abstract and thus often discounted, dignitary and justificatory 
rationales suggest that fired teachers deserve a chance to understand and 
contest the data, the reasoning, and even the objectives behind their firing. It 
is not just that the system as a whole needs to be refined or corrected. The 
individual subject to decisions by the system is intuitively owed some form 
of process; the big questions are why, when, and what. 
The dignitary argument—which for U.S. readers skeptical of dignity 
includes what are often characterized as autonomy concerns—posits that an 
individual human being should be respected as a whole, free person. Being 
subjected to algorithmic decision-making threatens individuals’ personhood 
by objectifying them.36 Objectification defeats autonomy: the freedom to 
make choices, be offered opportunities, or otherwise move freely through the 
world.37 Objectification can take a variety of forms ranging from directly 
denying autonomy to treating somebody as fungible (that is, exchangeable 
with someone else).38 Dignitary critiques of algorithmic decision-making 
reflect this range. 
It may help to pin down some more specific versions of the dignitary 
 
 35. Daniel N. Kluttz & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Automated Decision Support Technologies and the 
Legal Profession 37 (June 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“Technical design 
should seek to put professionals and decision support systems in conversation, not position professionals 
as passive recipients of system wisdom who must rely on out-of-system mechanisms to challenge them. 
For these reasons, calls for explainability . . . should be replaced by governance approaches that promote 
contestable systems.”).  
 36. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36 (James W. Ellington 
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785) (“Act in such a way that you treat humanity . . . always at 
the same time as an end and never simply as a means.”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures 
of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1180–89 (2004) (describing the German 
philosophical origins of privacy law). 
 37. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1545–50. 
 38. Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249, 256–57 (1995) (arguing that 
there are seven forms of objectification: instrumentalizing to achieve a further purpose; denying 
autonomy; treating as inert, as fungible, as violable, as owned by another person; and denying 
subjectivity). 
  
1542 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1529 
criticism.39 The first, largely European, criticism of algorithmic decision-
making is that allowing a decision about humans to be made by a machine 
inherently treats humans as objects, showing deep, inherent disrespect for 
peoples’ humanity.40 This particular version of a dignitary concern has been 
embraced by European legislators, while U.S. lawmakers and many U.S. 
persons have rejected it. 
A second type of dignitary concern appeals, however, across cultural 
divides. Automatically making decisions based on what categories an 
individual falls into—that is, what correlations can be shown between an 
individual and others—can fail to treat that individual as an individual.41 If 
algorithmic decision-making does not allow individuals to proclaim their 
individuality (“I may look like these other people, but I am not in fact like 
them”), then it violates their dignity and objectifies individuals as their traits, 
rather than treating an individual as a whole person.42 Both decisional 
discretion and individual process rights are, under this reasoning, necessary 
not just to prevent error but to adequately recognize and respect 
individuality.43 
This version of a dignitary concern resonates across the Atlantic with 
the legal tradition of equity. Long concerned with the unfairness of 
formalistic application of legal rules, the principles and practices of equity 
allow otherwise unfair decisions to be adapted to individual circumstances.44 
Decisions in equity can permit courts to look beyond factors the law 
ordinarily considers, to think about fairness in a particular set of 
circumstances. Similarly, the subject of an automated decision should be 
able to explain why an algorithm’s framing is not the full picture and to 
introduce individualizing, sometimes mitigating, factors an algorithm has 
not considered. 
Take, for example, the United States Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”) algorithm that decided that Somali-owned grocery stores in 
Seattle would no longer be permitted to accept food stamps because 
 
 39. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1119 (“[T]he personhood rationale can be 
converted to a more actionable legal issue . . . .”). 
 40. Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of Computer 
Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216, 231 (2017); Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The 
GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 995, 1016–17 (2017). 
 41. See Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1545–50. 
 42. Thanks to Alon Harel for helping to clarify this point at the Tel Aviv University Faculty 
seminar. 
 43. See Citron, supra note 14, at 1304. 
 44. See, e.g., Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 596 (Colo. 1951) (en banc). 
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customer behavior purportedly indicated cash-for-stamp fraud.45 The 
algorithm responded to “suspicious transactions,” such as even dollar 
amounts and large purchases made in short time spans. But the grocers had 
credible contextual explanations for these purportedly “unusual” practices: 
the shopping patterns of East African immigrants, which include shopping 
in groups and shopping for meat by whole-dollar amounts at Halal 
butchers.46 In addition to having instrumental implications—the algorithm 
incorrectly identified this behavior as fraud—the system’s failure to consider 
contextualizing factors to which the algorithm was blind led to unfair 
outcomes that objectified decisional subjects in too-broad strokes (“I may 
look like a cheat but I am not”). 
This notion that a person is more than the sum of her abstracted traits 
resonates with a concern in the privacy literature over the notion of the “data 
double”: a shadow self consisting of data points gathered about an individual, 
often without permission.47 People constantly engage in the process of self-
construction, determining both how they appear to others and who they are 
to themselves.48 A data double objectifies an individual by taking this 
dynamic, participatory process and placing it in the hands of other entities 
and out of the hands of the individual.  
Secret profiles and decisions made based on secret profiling can 
threaten personhood and thus dignity by proscribing active individual 
involvement in the construction of this objectified version of the self.49 This 
again resonates with aspects of U.S. law, even given the absence of federal 
data privacy law: the right of publicity and appropriation torts, which permit 
individuals to sue to protect use of their likenesses without permission; 
protection against public disclosure of private fact; and defamation, which 
 
 45. Somali Grocers: Feds Urged To Requalify Grocers for Food Stamps, KITSAP SUN 
(Apr. 14, 2002), https://products.kitsapsun.com/archive/2002/04-14/0038_somali_grocers__feds_urged 
_to_req.html. Thanks to Deirdre Mulligan for pointing to this example. For an overview of the USDA 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program algorithm, see H. Claire Brown, How an Algorithm Kicks 
Small Businesses Out of the Food Stamps Program on Dubious Fraud Charges, NEW FOOD ECON. (Oct. 
8, 2018), http://newfoodeconomy.org/usda-algorithm-food-stamp-snap-fraud-small-businesses. 
 46. Chris McGann, Somali Grocers Lose Right To Use Food Stamps, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 8, 2002, 10:00 PM), https://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Somali-grocers-lose-
right-to-use-food-stamps-1084746.php. 
 47. See, e.g., David Lyon, Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, 
Critique, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–Dec. 2014, at 1, 6; see also Evelyn Ruppert, The Government 
Topologies of Database Devices, THEORY, CULT. & SOC’Y, Oct. 4, 2012, at 116, 123–26. 
 48. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 49–50 (2012); Hildebrandt, supra note 
14, at 47–48. 
 49. Bygrave, supra note 14, at 18 (explaining that the “ ‘data shadows’ . . . threaten to usurp the 
constitutive authority of the physical self despite their relatively attenuated and often misleading nature”). 
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allows individuals to legally contest certain lies made about them.50 The 
rights of correction or amendment in select sectoral U.S. privacy laws—for 
example, the Privacy Act51 and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act’s (“HIPAA’s”) Privacy Rule52—also reflect this 
dignitary concern with individual participation in the creation of an object-
self. 
Finally, dignitary concerns include concerns (more familiar to 
Americans) about individual autonomy. Algorithmic decision-making 
founded on individual profiling limits the choices and, thus, the freedom a 
person will have.53 A teacher’s autonomy is circumscribed when the teacher 
is fired based on information and reasoning she cannot contest. There are 
fewer choices and, thus, less freedom in what employment opportunities the 
teacher can go on to pursue. Algorithms, too, determine the online ads we 
see, often on the basis of individual profiling.54 Ads for higher-paid, 
executive level, and science, technology, engineering, and math jobs have 
been shown to target men over women.55 Companies have been shown to 
target African Americans with ads for payday loans and credit cards with 
disadvantageous terms.56 Limiting the choices we see—whether by failing 
to show opportunities or by offering only bad options—limits our freedom 
to make choices. 
Failing to be transparent about the fact that individuals are being 
targeted or the reasons why they are targeted itself may threaten autonomy. 
Secret profiling and decision-making can lead to manipulation.57 Without 
 
 50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 652A, 652C, 652E (AM. LAW. INST. 1977); 
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).  
 51. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2) (2018)). 
 52. 45 C.F.R. § 164.526 (2019) (establishing the right to request amendment of records and right 
to submit a statement of disagreement if amendment is denied). 
 53. Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map To Examine 
Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 118, 
129–30 (2016) [hereinafter Zarsky, Trouble]; Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1541–50. 
 54. Patrick Kulp, Facebook Has Discriminated Against You, and It’s Not Going To Stop, 
MASHABLE (Nov. 12, 2016), https://mashable.com/2016/11/12/facebook-google-ad-discrimination. 
 55. Tom Simonite, Probing the Dark Side of Google’s Ad-Targeting System, MIT TECH. REV. 
(July 6, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/539021/probing-the-dark-side-of-googles-ad-
targeting-system. 
 56. Alvaro Bedoya & Clare Garvie, Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law, 
Comment Letter on Follow the Lead: An FTC Workshop on Lead Generation (Dec. 18, 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/12/00017-99877.pdf; 
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 157−58. 
 57. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1541−53; see also FREDERIK J ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, IMPROVING 
PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE AREA OF BEHAVIORAL TARGETING 62 (2015) (“Privacy isn’t merely about 
control. Privacy is about not being controlled. . . . Privacy as identity construction concerns protection 
against unreasonable steering or manipulation—by humans or by technology.” (footnote omitted)). 
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knowing how we are being targeted or why, we can be manipulated into 
making choices that are not autonomous at all.58 Concerns about autonomy 
and the potential for manipulation, to a great degree, motivated the 
indignation around Cambridge Analytica’s targeted manipulation of U.S. 
voters prior to the 2016 election (and motivated the California legislature to 
enact the California Consumer Privacy Act in 2018).59 
The third category of concerns about algorithmic decision-making, 
justificatory concerns, aims to ensure the legitimacy of a decisional system.60 
Justificatory concerns resonate strongly with calls for rule of law. 
Justificatory concerns about state action might be addressed through 
imposing individual due process or through creating a broad system of 
accountability like the Administrative Procedure Act.61 Justificatory 
concerns are not solely about fixing errors or bias; fixing errors or bias is a 
byproduct of ensuring that a decisional system is fair, valid, and legitimate. 
Rule-of-law values require not just explanations of decisions but 
justifications that are legitimate within a particular mode of reasoning.62 For 
 
 58. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1031–34 
(2014); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1311, 1326–31 (2015). Dignitary and autonomy concerns, in fact, share values with concerns about 
information asymmetries, or market failure. For a classic explanation of calls for regulation in the face of 
market failures, see Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 445 (describing market failures as occurring 
when there are “distributional inequities, unincorporated externalities, collective action failures and free 
rider problems, information asymmetries, cognitive biases, . . . scale inefficiencies[,] . . . national 
monopolies, . . . commons[,] . . . and ‘anticommons’ ” (footnote omitted)). 
 59. Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need To Know as Fallout 
Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cam 
bridge-analytica-explained.html (explaining that in March 2018, it came to light that tens of millions of 
people had their personal data misused by a data mining firm called Cambridge Analytica; a series of 
congressional hearings highlighted that our personal information may be vulnerable to misuse when 
shared on the Internet; as a result, our desire for privacy controls and transparency in data practices is 
heightened). 
 60. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1119 (“To the extent that the personhood 
rationale can be converted to a more actionable legal issue, it is reflected in the concept of ‘procedural 
justice’ . . . .”). 
 61. Citron, supra note 14, at 1278–79 (noting the “separate, yet parallel, procedural regimes that 
govern individual adjudications and rulemaking” and that “computers both render decisions about 
important individual rights and engage in rulemaking”). 
 62. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful 
Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1288 (2017) (“A key tenant of legality, separating lawful authority 
from ultra vires conduct, is the idea that not all explanations qualify as justifications.”). The justificatory 
rationale importantly goes beyond enabling people to challenge a particular decision or enabling people 
to change their behavior so as to obtain a different decision the next time. Sandra Wachter et al., 
Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 841, 880 (2018) (“[C]ounterfactual explanations do not attempt to clarify how 
decisions are made internally.”). It requires that enough be visible of decision-making substance and 
process so that its systemic legitimacy can be assessed. The justificatory rationale also differs from the 
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example, a police officer may explain that he has pulled you over because 
you drive the same car as his ex-girlfriend. That is an explanation, but not a 
legally or socially acceptable justification. Whether a decision is legally 
justified is largely given content by what rights the legal system gives to an 
individual to challenge a decision. For example, if legislators decide to give 
an individual the right to sue prospective employers for using genetic 
information in hiring determinations, they have effectively decided that 
hiring decisions cannot be justified by reference to an individual’s genetic 
background.63 Transparency is often necessary for justification; nobody can 
challenge the validity or legitimacy of a decision if they cannot see the 
reasoning it was based on.64 
Algorithmic decision-making triggers a particular set of justificatory 
concerns. When we replace human decision makers with nonhuman decision 
makers, we potentially eliminate important work that a human decision 
maker does to both fill in and circumscribe decisional context in a particular 
case.65 Human decision makers fill in context by carrying with them cultural 
knowledge about what is or is not an appropriate decisional heuristic in a 
particular case (“You are driving too fast” versus “You remind me of my 
ex”). Human decision makers have the capacity to expand decisional context 
when it seems unfair to ignore information a machine might not know is 
relevant (“You are speeding on the way to the hospital”). Human decision 
makers might also circumscribe context by knowing when it seems unfair to 
rely on information that strikes them as too far afield (“Because you use an 
iOS operating system, I am going to give you a ticket based on the likelihood 
 
computer science concept of accountability, which is concerned only with ensuring that a system applies 
the same rules to all individuals within it—that is, guaranteeing that there is no individual discrimination 
or arbitrariness. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 9–12; Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 702–05. That version 
of accountability neither presents justifications for analysis nor creates a procedural hook or other kinds 
of oversight to ensure the legitimacy of the decisional system. 
 63. See generally Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 
Stat. 881 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of someone’s genetic information). Similarly, as we see 
in Section III.B.1 below, the GDPR gives individuals transparency rights that are closely tied to their 
ability to contest a decision or correct information. 
 64. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1120–22. 
 65. Thanks to Michael Birnhack for this point. Kiel Brennan-Marquez and Andrew Selbst, it turns 
out, have debated exactly this issue of algorithmic decision-making and context. Brennan-Marquez, supra 
note 62, at 27 (“[T]he whole point of a[n] [algorithmic] tool . . . is to make predictions from correlative 
variables out of context—a process that, by its nature, frustrates inquiry into the tool’s case-by-case 
performance . . . .”); Andrew D. Selbst, A Mild Defense of Our New Machine Overlords, 70 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 87, 92 (2017) (explaining that an algorithmic decision-making “system would not be able 
to give a useful answer . . . unless the system has some way to connect that information to the context it 
needs”). 
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that you’ll speed in the future”).66 When we use algorithmic decision-
making, we take these human capacities and temporally remove them from 
the point at which an individual decision is made. Human decisions about 
how to treat context may be incorporated, to some extent, into the design of 
an algorithm, but they are absent at the end point when an algorithm is 
applied to a particular individual. Algorithms, as programmed entities fed 
both goals and datasets by humans who are more remote from a particular 
decision, are often or even inherently culturally or contextually incomplete. 
Algorithmic decision-making thus lacks certain capacities when compared 
to even a lousy human decision maker. 
Human contextual knowledge can clearly have much-discussed 
negative effects—for example, by bringing human biases and discrimination 
into decision-making.67 But it also serves an important role. It means that 
human decision makers will, for the most part, not produce particularly 
random explanations—that is, acontextual explanations that we are 
particularly likely to view as unjustified, such as connecting loan decisions 
to your smartphone choice or your choice about the color of your socks.68 It 
also means that human decision makers will easily weed out certain kinds of 
extreme error, like the decision by an algorithm to kill the pilot in the flight 
simulator because it realized it could obtain a perfect landing score by 
crashing the plane.69 Because algorithms both fail to import context and fail 
to circumscribe context as human decision makers do, we should ask for at 
least as much, if not more, justificatory transparency and process from 
algorithms as from human decision makers making the same decision. 
The justificatory rationale leads to more than calls for transparency. 
Justification requires process. Justification is not just about showing one’s 
 
 66. Louise Matsakis, Your Smartphone Choice Could Determine if You’ll Get a Loan, WIRED 
(May 8, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/your-smartphone-could-decide-whether-youll-
get-a-loan. 
 67. See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 500 (2015). For a longer discussion of 
cognitive biases beyond discrimination, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, supra note 16. 
 68. Ed Felten, What Does It Mean To Ask for an “Explainable” Algorithm?, FREEDOM TO TINKER 
(May 31, 2017), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/05/31/what-does-it-mean-to-ask-for-an-
explainable-algorithm. 
 69. Janelle Shane, When Algorithms Surprise Us, AI WEIRDNESS (Apr. 13, 2018, 10:59 AM), 
http://aiweirdness.com/post/172894792687/when-algorithms-surprise-us. Thanks to Christina Mulligan 
for this pointer. Another great example—“[A]n algorithm that was supposed to sort a list of numbers. 
Instead, it learned to delete the list, so that it was no longer technically unsorted.” Id.; see also Daniela 
Hernandez & Ted Greenwald, IBM Has a Watson Dilemma, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2018, 12:19 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ibm-bet-billions-that-watson-could-improve-cancer-treatment-it-hasnt-wo 
rked-1533961147 (quoting Dr. Lukas Wartman of Washington University School of Medicine on IBM’s 
Watson cancer system: “The discomfort that I have—and that others have had with using it—has been 
the sense that you never know what you’re really going to get”). 
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reasoning, but about ensuring the legitimacy of a decisional system. Affected 
individuals are more likely to perceive a decisional system as legitimate 
“when they play a meaningful role in the process.”70 Different forms of 
process may apply to different kinds of algorithmic decision-making, as in 
the law. For example, procedural due process requires individualized notice 
and an opportunity to be heard, but only in some contexts.71 The U.S. legal 
system also contains systemic justificatory systems beyond individual due 
process, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, which is less discussed 
in the algorithmic governance literature.72 
In fact U.S. law is full of different kinds of justificatory obligations. A 
warrant requirement can be understood as a justificatory requirement, 
requiring the police to justify why they believe they have probable cause for 
search or seizure.73 The legal standard for admitting expert evidence, the 
Daubert standard, can be understood as a justificatory requirement, requiring 
parties to justify bringing expert information that has authority outside of the 
law into the legal system.74 Even open government law, such as the Freedom 
of Information Act and Federal Advisory Committee Act, can be 
characterized as justificatory in nature, demonstrating the legitimacy of 
government decision-making through both transparency and process 
requirements. In many areas of the law, a combination of substantive and 
procedural requirements serves to demonstrate that a decision-making 
process is both based on normatively and legally acceptable justifications 
and is procedurally fair. 
Thus subscribing to the justificatory rationale for regulating algorithmic 
decision-making can lead to both calls for individual due process and calls 
for systemic oversight and accountability.75 When an individual is subjected 
 
 70. Freeman, supra note 6, at 656 (“[P]arties are more likely to view outcomes as legitimate when 
they play a meaningful role in the process . . . [and are] included in the enterprise, taken seriously, and 
offered explanations for decisions.”). Procedural justice is not an empty concept; individuals are more 
likely to accept a decision if they believe the process was fair. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, 
Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 317–18 (2003).  
 71. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 113 (“[T]he level of due process required differs 
according to the gravity of the deprivation and the magnitude of the countervailing state interest . . . .”). 
 72. The exception to this is Citron, supra note 14, at 1279, 1288–91 (emphasizing both individual 
due process and systemic accountability under the Administrative Procedure Act and noting that the use 
of automated systems “creates confusion about the procedures owed individuals, interfering with both 
due process guarantees and rulemaking procedures”). 
 73. See generally Brennan-Marquez, supra note 62 (characterizing the Fourth Amendment’s 
probable cause requirement as a “plausible cause” or justifiability requirement). 
 74. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598–99 (1993); see also Citron, supra 
note 14, at 1307 (discussing Daubert). 
 75. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1519–21 (discussing the need for interpretability to go beyond 
correlations to understandings of causality). 
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to a decision that has significant effects on that individual, we traditionally 
require individualized justifications.76 But when we make broad systemic 
decisions or write rules that will govern everyone, we often look to collective 
or proxy systems for justification. Because algorithmic decision-making is 
really both kinds of decisional systems (broad policies for many people 
coupled with individual decisions with deep effects on individuals), both 
approaches to justification may apply.77 This results in calls for individual 
due process and explanations (“Let me show you how and why this decision 
was made about you and let you contest it”) coupled with calls for third-party 
accountability (“Let me assure you that neutral experts are providing 
oversight to make sure this decision was made fairly and for fair reasons”). 
As discussed at greater length below,78 in a binary system, systemic 
accountability measures also serve more than one purpose: they may bolster 
individual rights by providing oversight in the name of protecting 
individuals, and provide the accountability necessary to oversee 
collaborative governance, as companies create and implement rules. 
The dignitary and justificatory rationales often significantly overlap. A 
decisional system flouts rule-of-law values if individuals do not have 
meaningful dignity or autonomy within it.79 It lacks legitimacy if individuals 
cannot meaningfully invoke procedural safeguards or assess its logical 
underpinnings. Similarly, tools used to provide justification and procedural 
legitimacy can contribute substantially to improving a decision’s impact on 
human dignity and autonomy by enabling individual participation and 
allowing challenges to decisions when a person has been characterized by 
that person’s traits instead of treated as an individual. 
Of the three concerns, however, the instrumental concern about 
algorithmic decision-making is by far the most prevalent in recent 
scholarship.80 Perhaps this is because, as with privacy harms in general, 
dignity can be hard to pin down.81 Or it may be that some scholars do not 
 
 76. See infra Section II.A. 
 77. Citron, supra note 14, at 1253 (noting that algorithmic decision-making combines individual 
adjudication with rulemaking). 
 78. See infra Section II.C. 
 79. Hildebrandt, supra note 14, at 48 (“[P]rivacy is also a public good that concerns a citizen’s 
‘freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of her identity.’ This freedom is a 
precondition for democracy and rule of law . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 80. See, e.g., Kroll et. al, supra note 14, at 636. (listing three slightly different harms: “incorrect, 
unjustified, or unfair” (discriminatory) outcomes from computers); Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1569 
(describing the use of machine learning decision-making as potentially “ineffective, error-ridden, 
generat[ing] chilling effects, lead[ing] to unfair discrimination, and . . . prone to enable or even encourage 
function creep”). 
 81. See, e.g., Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1119 (“Ultimately, that there is 
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subscribe to either the dignitary or justificatory arguments. Those scholars 
who reject individualized algorithmic due process and individualized 
transparency largely implicitly reject both the dignitary and justificatory 
rationales for them.82 They understand regulating private-sector algorithms 
as being largely about correcting error or discrimination and bias. They view 
the problems of algorithmic decision-making as consumer protection 
problems, best addressed not through individual rights but through a broader, 
more systemic regulatory approach. 
The next Part addresses the “what” of governing algorithmic decision-
making:83 What kinds of regulation do we put in place, given the above three 
rationales for regulating? But one final preliminary discussion is necessary 
before moving on to the regulatory framework. Just as not every government 
action triggers the same level of due process,84 not every use of algorithms 
in decision-making might trigger a full regulatory regime. The threshold 
question is what uses of algorithms should be covered. 
The EU’s GDPR illustrates how this threshold question of coverage 
might be answered. For one, it might be a matter of how much human 
 
inherent value in explanation is clear. But as a practical matter, those concerns are difficult to 
administer . . . .”).  
 82. See, e.g., Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1552 (describing the EU idea that dignitary harms justify a 
freedom from machine decision-making as “an anachronistic notion” stemming from “neo-Luddite” 
tendencies). Elsewhere Zarsky does recognize other dignitary interests. See, e.g., Zarsky, Trouble, supra 
note 53, at 129. Dignity also sometimes gets outright ignored. See generally Kroll et al., supra note 14 
(discussing this topic without mentioning dignity at all); Wachter et al., supra note 62 (same). 
 83. See infra Part II. 
 84. Ambrosino v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that 
termination of membership based on a physician's previous drug addiction violated the common law right 
to fair procedures); St. Agnes Hosp., Inc. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319, 336–42 (D. Md. 1990); Cotran v. 
Rollings Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 422 (Cal. 1998) (stating that “good cause” in context of 
implied employment contract requires an “appropriate” investigation, which is “not arbitrary or 
pretextual,” and includes “notice of the claimed misconduct and a chance for the employee to respond”); 
Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 267–68 (Cal. 1974) (holding that orthodontist 
society must use fair process in rejecting application for membership); Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 76 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 382, 387 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[I]nvestigative fairness contemplates listening to both sides and 
providing employees a fair opportunity to present their position and to correct or contradict relevant 
statements prejudicial to their case, without the procedural formalities of a trial.” (citing Cotran, 948 P.2d 
at 422)); Curl v. Pac. Home, 239 P.2d 481, 483–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (involving nursing home 
termination of residence and analogizing residence to membership in private organization); Falcone v. 
Middlesex Cty. Med. Soc'y, 170 A.2d 791, 799–800 (N.J. 1961) (holding that membership decisions by 
county medical society are subject to judicial review and may not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or contrary 
to public policy); Freeman, supra note 6, at 588–91 (describing examples of due-process-like protections 
applied to the private sector); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for 
Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 999–1010 (1930); F. Eric Fryar, Note, Common-Law Due Process Rights 
in the Law of Contracts, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1021, 1041–49 (1988). 
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involvement or oversight there is over the decision-making.85 Only “solely” 
automated decisions are subject to the GDPR’s requirements of explanation 
and contestation.86 If a decision by an algorithm is subject to meaningful 
human review, meaning a human decision maker has the capacity and ability 
to contest that decision, then a number of the GDPR’s individual rights do 
not apply. This suggests that in the EU, at least, human involvement in 
decision-making is seen as somehow mitigating the dignitary, justificatory, 
and even instrumental concerns about algorithmic decision-making. 
Second, whether an algorithmic decision should be targeted for 
regulation might turn on the extent and nature of the impact the decision has, 
as with procedural due process. The GDPR regulates algorithmic decision-
making differently from general data processing only if it produces “legal 
effects” or “similarly significant[]” effects.87 The denial of a loan is a 
significant effect; whether being subjected to targeted advertising is a 
significant effect has been subject to some debate.88 
Third, algorithmic decision-making might be regulated differently or 
trigger regulation at different thresholds in different policy contexts and 
against the backdrop of different areas of the law. For example, concerns 
about algorithmic decision-making are heightened in the criminal context, 
where state action is clear and the consequence of imprisonment is harsh and 
concrete.89 By contrast, in the medical context, while the effects of a decision 
may be equally serious, we may be less concerned with a patient’s ability to 
challenge or understand the rationale behind a decision (especially as 
patients often delegate decision-making to a trusted expert) and more 
concerned instrumentally with making sure the decision is unbiased, correct, 
and overseen and contextualized by a trusted medical professional. Existing 
laws, too, such as evidence and criminal procedure in the criminal context 
and fiduciary responsibilities and Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
regulations in the medical context, may interact with, affect, or even be 
 
 85. See Citron, supra note 14, at 1307; Meg Leta Jones, The Ironies of Automation Law: Tying 
Policy Knots with Fair Automation Practices Principles, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 77, 118 (2015). 
 86. Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 201 
(2019).  
 87. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 46 (EU). 
 88. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 48; Kaminski, supra note 86, at 202. 
 89. There, too, the identity of the regulated actor may complicate the concept of collaborative 
governance. When the state acquires technology from private companies, as is often the case, 
collaborative governance might be applied to those companies, and procurement methods may be a 
vehicle for regulation. When the state builds its own technology, while many of the tools of collaborative 
governance may still work (impact assessments, expert boards, audits, etc.), the governance of a state 
actor is not usually considered within the purview of collaborative governance. 
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vehicles for introducing the type of regulatory regime discussed in Part II.90 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully address threshold coverage 
questions or to contextualize the regulatory approach proposed below to 
specific legal contexts or applications. It may be that this binary approach is 
not the right fit everywhere. Or it may be the case that the binary approach 
is necessary but not sufficient, and that it will need to be calibrated along 
with substantive rights—for example, in antidiscrimination law. But in 
identifying the reasons behind calls for regulating algorithmic decision-
making and tracing those reasons to regulatory design, this Article identifies 
common threads in the literature and aims to form the basis for future 
conversations about algorithmic decision-making in specific policy contexts. 
II.  THE BINARY APPROACH 
Understanding that there are three different categories of concerns 
behind calls for regulating algorithmic decision-making explains why the 
proposed solutions thus far have involved such an array of regulatory 
tactics—from explanations of individual decisions, to expert oversight 
within companies, to specific design requirements for algorithms. Those who 
are concerned about dignitary harm or individualized justification of 
decisions call for individualized due process-like protections. Those who 
focus, instead, on instrumental goals or systemic justification see less of a 
value in individual rights because, as discussed below, individual rights are 
not the best way to achieve instrumental goals and broad systemic oversight 
might actually do more to legitimate a system than individual challenges.91 
Identifying these three categories of concerns lets us explore how to 
reconcile this conflict. It is possible to design a system of regulation to 
address all three. 
To address all three categories of concerns about algorithmic decision-
making (dignitary, justificatory, and instrumental), we need a regulatory 
system that employs a two-part, or binary, approach. An individual rights 
regime can address dignitary and individualized justificatory concerns but is 
less well suited to fix systemic problems such as bias or malfunction or 
provide systemic legitimacy. Instrumental goals are better addressed through 
 
 90. Similarly, discussions of the use of algorithmic decision-making for content moderation online 
trigger yet another set of policy concerns and a distinct legal landscape of First Amendment doctrine and 
related intermediary liability law. See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and 
Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1609–13, 1636–37, 1636 n.263 (2018) 
(especially note 263); Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 511–13 (2017). 
 91. See infra Section II.A. 
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a systemic approach, likely using collaborative governance, to affect both 
the design of algorithms and the organizational design of the human systems 
around them. A systemic approach may also be necessary to produce a 
justified or legitimate decision-making system, given individual resource 
constraints and limited expertise. But a systemic approach alone will not be 
adequate, since it fails to capture significant dignitary and justificatory 
concerns—and in some cases, may miss out on the capacity of individual 
challenges to correct bias and error or provide accountability for the system 
as a whole. To effectively govern algorithmic decision-making, we need 
both. 
Several existing proposals—most prominently from Danielle Citron, 
Frank Pasquale, Kate Crawford, and Jason Schultz—call for both 
approaches: individual rights combined with some form of systemic 
governance.92 These authors, however, do not identify that systemic 
approaches to algorithmic accountability are functionally attempts at 
collaborative governance. This leads to some missed insights from the 
literature on private-public partnerships, discussed below.93 Nor do these 
authors explore the interactions between individual rights and systemic 
governance. The binary approach explored here goes beyond porting 
individual due process and systemic oversight mechanisms from other areas 
of law, and from existing data privacy principles, to discuss overall 
regulatory design. This Part asks how these different regulatory features 
serve the goals of regulation, how they interact, where they might conflict, 
and how they work as a system. 
A.  AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS REGIME 
An individual rights regime can address both dignitary and justificatory 
concerns about algorithmic decision-making. By giving individuals 
transparency and input into profiling or decision-making, we respect their 
dignity and prevent objectification. By providing individual transparency, 
explanation, and participation rights, we address justificatory concerns about 
the legitimacy of an algorithmic decisional system. Such a system would let 
someone like Wysocki, the fired teacher, receive notice that she was subject 
to algorithmic decision-making; receive an explanation of some kind of why 
the decision was made; and have some kind of right to challenge the decision. 
 
 92. Citron, supra note 14, at 1305, 1308–13 (addressing public sector use of algorithmic decision-
making and calling for both individual rights and “[r]eplacing [r]ulemaking [p]rocedures” with testing, 
stakeholder involvement, and more); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, 1301–13; Crawford & Schultz, 
supra note 5, 125–28. 
 93. See infra Section II.B. 
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This idea of algorithmic due process is not new. Several scholars have 
argued at length for individual due process-like protections.94 In the context 
of government actions, procedural due process requires that individuals 
deprived of a significant interest be provided both notice and an opportunity 
to be heard before a neutral arbiter before the deprivation occurs.95 The 
algorithmic due process literature ports these requirements and others into 
the context of algorithmic decision-making. 
The literature argues that individual due process protections should be 
put in place even when the algorithmic decision is made by a private, 
nonstate actor.96 It largely analogizes from the regime of due-process-like 
rights established under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), which 
applies to private sector “consumer reporting agencies.” The FCRA requires 
disclosure of your credit score and the information a consumer reporting 
agency holds on you (“file disclosure”); creates a right to dispute incomplete 
or inaccurate information; and creates a right to be told if information in the 
file has been used against you, among other things.97  
There are a number of examples available in U.S. law beyond the FCRA 
of due-process-like protections applied to decisions made by private parties 
with particularly significant consequences. For example, courts have put in 
place due process-like requirements for employment decisions, for 
membership decisions by professional organizations, and for decisions to 
terminate residence in a nursing home.98 Congress, too, has enacted privacy 
laws that give individuals rights of access and correction for information held 
by private companies.99 These laws and decisions suggest an intuition by 
U.S. courts and legislators that significant decisions made by private parties 
can be made subject to individual process “rights.” 
The algorithmic due process literature calls for various types of 
individualized “meaningful notice.” These notice proposals include 
 
 94. Citron, supra note 14, at 1313; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 19−20; Crawford & Schultz, 
supra note 5, at 120–21. 
 95. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970); see also Houston Federation of Teachers, 
Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1172–73 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Crawford & 
Schultz, supra note 5, at 111. 
 96. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 19; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 121–28. 
 97. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 16–17; Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, 
at 1101. 
 98. See supra note 84. 
 99. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(B) (2018) (tasking the Federal Trade Commission with 
creating means for parents to access children’s information gathered by websites); 47 U.S.C. § 551(d) 
(giving cable subscribers access to personally identifiable information collected and maintained by a 
cable operator and a “reasonable opportunity to correct any error in such information”); 16 C.F.R. § 312.6 
(2019) (stating the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act rule). 
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notifying individuals that a decision is going to be made,100 notifying 
individuals of the general sources of data inputs,101 notifying individuals of 
privacy risks,102 giving individuals the right to inspect data about them,103 
and establishing and disclosing audit trails that record both facts and rules 
supporting algorithmic decisions.104 Many of these notice requirements are, 
in fact, aspects of the Fair Information Practices (“FIPs”) on which many 
data privacy laws are based. To make notice effective and avoid 
overwhelming nonexperts, several scholars have suggested using technology 
that allows individuals to tinker with algorithmic decision-making to get a 
sense of how it works.105 As discussed in Part III, there is a hearty debate 
ongoing in the EU over whether individuals should be afforded an 
explanation of an algorithmic decision and, if so, what kind of explanation 
they should be afforded.106 
Algorithmic due process proposals also call for multiple kinds of 
opportunities to be heard. Proposals have called for individuals to have the 
right to correct inaccurate data.107 This can involve allowing individuals to 
challenge not just erroneous personal data but erroneous inferences and 
scores.108 Proposals have called for individuals to be given an opportunity to 
challenge a decision in front of a neutral third party, such as the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”).109 In that process, individuals could examine 
evidence used against them, including the data, the algorithmic logic applied 
and the audit trails.110 Or an opportunity to be heard could be less robust and 
less neutral, internalized within a company as the opportunity to obtain 
human involvement in an algorithmic decision, either during the process or 
ex post.111 
 
 100. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 28. 
 101. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 20; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 125. 
 102. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 126 (stating that notification happens in a way 
“reasonably calculated” to inform people of privacy risks). 
 103. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 20. 
 104. See Citron, supra note 14, at 1305. 
 105. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 28–30; see also Hildebrandt, supra note 14, at 53–54. For 
a similar suggestion in the copyright law context, see Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box 
Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 190–200 (2017). 
 106. Kaminski, supra note 86, at 198. 
 107. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 126–27; Kaminski, supra note 86, at 213 (discussing the 
right to correction in the GDPR). 
 108. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 28. 
 109. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 127. 
 110. Id. at 127–28. 
 111. Putting a human in the loop or on the loop raises the specter of automation bias—the human 
tendency to take as authoritative decisions made by machines. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 6–
8 (describing the levels of automation spoken about in autonomous weapons literature, including humans 
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Algorithmic due process would address both dignitary and justificatory 
concerns about algorithmic decision-making. Disclosing secret systems and 
allowing individuals to participate in and correct both profiling and decision-
making respects human dignity.112 Individualized procedural protections 
would also address justificatory concerns to the extent that they make visible 
the bases of decisions and create accountability through process.113 
As has been argued in the literature, these individual rights would also 
have at least some instrumental value. Individual due process has been 
described as a form of system management, uncovering and correcting 
systemic errors, bias, and discrimination.114 By allowing individuals the 
opportunity to correct both factual and legal errors in their own proceedings, 
individualized due process can lead to larger corrections in both the 
application and creation of rules.115 It can decrease bias and outright 
discrimination both by permitting challenges to individual decisions and by 
exposing decisional systems to external evaluation for compliance with legal 
principles and societal norms.116 In the context of expert decision-making, 
 
in the loop, humans on the loop, and humans out of the loop). For alternative ways to classify automation 
levels, see NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PRELIMINARY 
STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 4-5 (2019), https://www.nhtsa.gov/ 
staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf (defining vehicle automation as having five 
levels: “No-Automation” (Level 0), “Function-specific Automation” (Level 1), “Combined Function 
Automation” (Level 2), “Limited Self-Driving Automation” (Level 3), and “Full Self-Driving 
Automation” (Level 4)); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS 4 (2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/ 
13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf (relying on levels designated by the Society of Automotive 
Engineers to define automation); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY 9–10 (2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/ 
files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf (same); see also Paul Godsmark, The Definitive 
Guide to the Levels of Automation for Driverless Cars, WONDER HOW TO, https://driverless.wonder 
howto.com/news/definitive-guide-levels-automation-for-driverless-cars-0176009 (last updated Apr. 9, 
2017, 9:51 PM). Humans could be trained on “automation bias” (the likelihood that a human will 
unquestioningly accept an automated decision) and be required to “explain, in detail, their reliance on the 
automated system’s decision.” Citron, supra note 14, at 1306−07. 
 112. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 27; Hildebrandt, supra note 14, at 47–48; Zarsky, supra 
note 14, at 1548–49. 
 113. See Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self: From Agnostic to 
Agonistic Machine Learning, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 83, 119–20 (2019). 
 114. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 121. 
 115. Citron, supra note 14, at 1280, 1284–86; see also Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 119 
(listing the following due process values: “(1) accuracy; (2) the appearance of fairness; (3) equality of 
inputs into the process; (4) predictability, transparency, and rationality; (5) participation; (6) revelation; 
and (7) privacy-dignity” (footnotes omitted)). 
 116. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 120 (observing that due process is also a check and 
balance—“a core function of due process is to separate those who write the legal code from adjudicators 
who use it. . . . [In big data,] there is no system of checks and balances to ensure that biases are not present 
in the system, which is especially crucial to a system of enforcement” (footnote omitted)). 
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putting a human expert in the loop as a proxy or fiduciary for the affected 
individual could prevent error by ensuring that individualized context is 
included in the decision. 
These are all good reasons for giving individuals transparency and 
process rights over machine decisions. The problem, however, is that 
individual rights are not a particularly good way to correct a complex, 
opaque, and evolving system.117 
B.  COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE 
While individual rights can address important dignitary and 
justificatory concerns, there are better ways to identify and fix systemic 
problems in algorithmic decision-making. A growing body of literature calls 
for moving away from ex post, individualized transparency and due process 
or, at least, supplementing them with regulations that target algorithmic 
design at earlier stages and target the human systems around algorithms.118 
This second camp of algorithmic accountability proposals ranges from 
 
 117. This is why the algorithmic due process literature also calls for systemic accountability on top 
of individual due process. In addition to individual notice and an opportunity to be heard, the due process 
literature contains proposals for publicly releasing the source code, releasing information about the 
system’s logics, releasing information about the datasets (but not the datasets themselves), oversight by 
a board of experts, third-party and government audits, and government agency oversight. Citron, supra 
note 14, at 1308–10, 12; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 20–28, 31. 
 118. One set of scholars calls for moving away from individual transparency and process rights. See 
Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 10; Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 15, at 23; Kroll 
et al., supra note 14, at 636−42. Tal Zarsky weighs the pros and cons of individual transparency against 
a host of other interests. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 657–60. Zarsky and Jane Bambauer more recently 
discuss the problem of gaming raised by individual rights. Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm 
Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2018). By contrast both Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford and 
Andrew Selbst and Solon Barocas can be understood as saying that individual transparency is sometimes 
necessary but not sufficient. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 982; Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive 
Appeal, supra note 4, at 1088. And as discussed in supra note 117, the algorithmic due process literature 
also emphasizes systemic accountability. 
  If there is a consensus between the divergent branches of the literature, it is that most call for 
something like systemic “accountability by design.” Kroll and others call for implementing this earlier in 
the design process, with specific technical recommendations. Kroll et al., supra note 14. David Lehr and 
Paul Ohm similarly call for more of a focus on the training phase of machine learning. Lehr & Ohm, 
supra note 3, at 716–17. Ananny and Crawford suggest a greater focus on the human-machine assemblage 
rather than the machine itself. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 983–84. And Selbst and Barocas 
similarly emphasize recording requirements, which will capture more of what happens at earlier phases. 
Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1129–38. It is in fact a bit disingenuous of later 
literature to characterize algorithmic due process only as a set of individual transparency and process 
rights. Even the earlier-stage algorithmic due process literature called for instituting systemic 
accountability measures beyond individual due process. Citron, supra note 14, at 1308–13; Citron & 
Pasquale, supra note 4, at 20–27; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5; see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE 
BLACK BOX SOCIETY 140–88 (2015) (calling for a system of layered “qualified transparency”). 
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suggesting specific technical requirements for building algorithms119 to 
calling for a patchwork of systemic accountability mechanisms, such as 
whistle-blower protections120 or impact assessments and other forms of 
transparency.121 
To some extent, this second camp is right about individual due process 
rights. Individual rights are a limited tool for finding and fixing system-wide 
problems such as error, bias, and discrimination in algorithms. In part this is 
because of the limited capacity of rights-bearing individuals, whether 
technical, behavioral, legal, or economic.122 In part this is because 
uncovering systemic problems such as discrimination will be easier to do 
with an eye to the system’s overall behavior, rather than by evaluating one-
off decisions.123 And in part this is because of timing. The ability to challenge 
individual decisions or determinations after-the-fact or even at regular 
intervals will not be as effective at fixing a machine learning algorithm as 
designing a good system from the onset124 or monitoring for compliance on 
an ongoing basis.125 This is because of the nature of machine learning 
algorithms: much of the work happens at the design and training stages, and 
it can be very hard or even impossible to assess and correct a running 
model.126 Some algorithms, too, evolve over time. Trying to regulate the 
quality of these systems through individual challenges will constitute an 
elaborate game of whack-a-mole.127 Thus, more recent literature on 
algorithmic accountability has either decried individual process and 
transparency as inadequate by itself128 or rejected individual rights and called 
 
 119. Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 662–72. 
 120. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 42–64; Katyal, supra note 8, at 99–141. 
 121. A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from 
Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1757–58; Price, supra note 8, at 466 
(describing a mandatory disclosure regime); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 
52 GA. L. REV. 109, 169–72 (2017); David Wright & Charles D. Raab, Constructing a Surveillance 
Impact Assessment, 28 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 613, 616–22 (2012). 
 122. Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 74–75. 
 123. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1111–13. 
 124. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 41–42 (discussing the limits of ex post testing); Kroll et al, 
supra note 14, at 656–78.  
 125. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 982 (discussing ongoing disclosure and noting that 
“[a]ny notion of transparency or auditing without temporal dimensions misses seeing previous iterations, 
understanding how they worked, why they changed, and how their interacting components actually 
constituted different systems”). 
 126. Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 640; Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 657. 
 127. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 41 (“[D]ynamic systems . . . , especially highly dynamic 
systems, that are not designed for evaluation pose perhaps a larger problem . . . .”).  
 128. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 984 (“[T]ransparency alone cannot create accountable 
systems.”). 
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for different kinds of accountability mechanisms altogether.129 More recent 
literature, too, has pushed back against public transparency, arguing instead 
for court and expert oversight. 130 
The literature has arrived at an important inflection point: it shows that 
individual due process is not the best way to address instrumental concerns 
about algorithmic decision-making. But the discussion is also incomplete. It 
fails to capture the bigger picture of what exactly the proposed array of 
accountability tools is meant to accomplish. I argue that what these proposals 
are driving at is collaborative governance of algorithmic decision-making.131 
1.  Collaborative Governance 
Collaborative governance, or “new governance,”132 deploys private-
public partnerships towards public governance goals. Collaborative 
governance should not be confused with self-regulation, though it may 
include or even rely in substantial part on private governance. In its ideal 
form, collaborative governance is not hands-off or deregulatory.133 It exists 
on a spectrum between traditional command-and-control regulation and 
private ordering, and may employ significant aspects of each.134  
On one end of this spectrum are top-down, government-dominated 
 
 129. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 56–64 (calling for whistleblower protection and a public 
interest cause of action); Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 15, at 74–80 (describing 
the aspects of the GDPR that go beyond individual rights); Kroll et al, supra note 14, at 639-640. 
 130. Kroll et al, supra note 14, at 657–60. 
 131. Only a handful of scholars, as mentioned, have explicitly called for the collaborative 
governance of algorithms. See Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 456; Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 8, at 
530; Price, supra note 8, at 421. 
 132. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 346–47. As Orly Lobel has explained, 
[T]he governance model emerges from a myriad of recent scholarly theories including . . . 
reflexive law, soft law, collaborative governance, democratic experimentalism, responsive 
regulation, outsourcing regulation, reconstitutive law, post-regulatory law, revitalizing 
regulation, regulatory pluralism, decentering regulation, meta-regulation, contractarian law, 
communicative governance, negotiated governance, destabilization rights, cooperative 
implementation, interactive compliance, public laboratories, deepened democracy and 
empowered participatory governance, pragmatic lawyering, nonrival partnership, and a daring 
legal system. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133. Lobel, New Governance, supra note 7, at 69 (“These approaches . . . do not, however, entail a 
complete shift from command-and-control regulation to self-regulation. . . . [T]he central challenge . . . 
is to maintain an effective role for law and regulation amidst the shifts to more private efforts of 
governance.”). 
 134. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 396 (“[T]he delegation of decisionmaking discretion to private 
firms does not change their nature as parties who must follow the law. . . . [I]mposing civil or criminal 
penalties provides an important means of ex post punishment . . . .”); see also Emily S. Bremer, Private 
Complements to Public Governance, 81 MO. L. REV. 1115, 1116–22 (2016) (illustrating a spectrum of 
public-private approaches). 
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approaches, in which government institutions dictate and enforce the law’s 
substance. On the other end is private ordering, in which private sector actors 
voluntarily undertake self-regulation in the absence of government action.135 
Collaborative governance represents a hybrid or, in the case of “responsive 
regulation,” an escalating approach.136 It may include but is not limited to 
formal coregulation through the adoption of codes of conduct or certification 
mechanisms.137 Collaborative governance is, at best, a highly tailored, site-
calibrated regulatory system that aims to pull inputs from, obtain buy-in 
from, and affect the internal institutional structures and decision-making 
heuristics of the private sector, while maintaining the legitimacy, efficacy, 
and public-interest orientation of public sector governance. 
There are a number of much-touted benefits to collaborative 
governance compared to command-and-control regulation on the one hand 
and self-regulation on the other.138 Proponents of purely private governance 
(self-regulation) point out that some regulatory problems are ill-suited to a 
command-and-control approach.139 This may be because the private sector 
has technical expertise the government cannot obtain140 or because the 
technology at issue is evolving at a rate top-down regulation cannot keep up 
 
 135. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1116. 
 136. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 4–7; William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy 
Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 983–85 (2016). 
 137. Formal coregulation—that is, the use of industry codes of conduct to set substantive standards 
in the law and the sharing of government responsibility with industry for enforcement—can be understood 
as a version of collaborative governance or a set of tools in the collaborative toolkit, although some 
authors use the terms “coregulation” and “collaborative governance” interchangeably. CHRISTOPHER T. 
MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION 59–63 (2011) (contrasting a wide range of forms of collaborative 
governance, which Christopher Marsden calls coregulation, from self-regulation, to “Potemkin” 
regulators that have little to no power, to collaborative governance with significant teeth); Dennis D. 
Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 465–66 (2011). Europe and countries like Australia have been experimenting 
with versions of both formal coregulation and a spectrum of collaborative governance techniques for 
years, especially in the Internet sector. Hirsch, supra note 137, at 442–43; see also IAN BROWN & 
CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE 3–4 (2013). There has been comparatively little 
discussion of collaborative governance as applied to technology law in the U.S. landscape. Ian Brown & 
Chris Marsden, Regulating Code: Towards Prosumer Law? 4 (Feb. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224263 (“Adoption of [coregulation] in the United 
States has been slow . . . .”). But see Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 529, 552–84 (2009). 
 138. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1122–24 (suggesting looking to “the concept of comparative 
institutional advantage” to decide when to turn to private governance); Hirsch, supra note 137, at 439–
44 (discussing the arguments for and against coregulation). 
 139.  Bremer, supra note 134, at 1123–24; Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 435–36; Hirsch, supra note 
137, at 455, 458–59.  
 140.  Bremer, supra note 134, at 1123; Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 465. 
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with (the so-called “pacing problem”).141 Even short of the pacing problem, 
private institutions may be more nimble and efficient,142 self-regulation may 
better approximate a market-driven optimum,143 and involving the private 
sector in its own regulation may lead to greater buy-in and adherence to 
voluntary rules over time.144 
The central problem with self-regulation is, of course, capture. Inherent 
in the notion of self-regulation is that the regulated set the substance of their 
own regulation and participate in enforcement and compliance, often without 
input by representatives of the public interest or competing voices from the 
private sector.145 Even where the substance of self-regulation is publicly 
oriented, self-regulating companies can lack mechanisms to enforce 
compliance, and the risk of free riding means every actor has a strong 
incentive not to comply.146 Private governance, too, is ill-suited for areas 
with a high degree of divergence between interests, which may prevent 
substantive agreement, thus thwarting the purported benefits of voluntary 
buy-in and nimbleness or efficiency.147 
Collaborative governance is a middle ground, a third way, that aims to 
harness the benefits of self-regulation without its pitfalls.148 The government 
stays significantly involved as a backdrop threat to nudge private sector 
involvement, as a forum for convening and empowering conflicting voices, 
as an arbiter or certifier in the name of the public interest, and as a hammer 
that can come down to enforce compliance. Often in collaborative 
governance, the government does some version of all of the above.149 The 
toolkit of collaborative governance ranges from formal delegation to the 
 
 141.  Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 421; Meg Leta Jones, Does Technology Drive Law? The Dilemma 
of Technological Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw, 2018 J.L., TECH. & POL’Y. 249, 277–81; Scherer, supra 
note 14, at 367–73; see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, New Governance, Chief 
Privacy Officers, and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the United States: An Initial 
Inquiry, 33 L. & POL’Y 477, 483 (2011) (“As the pace of technological and market change accelerated, 
both rule-based and purely self-regulatory approaches have become increasingly less relevant to the 
protection of privacy.”); Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 24, 38–39 (2012); Freeman, supra note 7, at 28 (describing collaborative governance as “a 
flexible, adaptive system capable of responding to advances in science, technology, knowledge . . . [when] 
rules are shaped by, and responsive to, the particular contexts in which they are deployed”). 
 142.  Bremer, supra note 134, at 1123. 
 143.  Hirsch, supra note 137, at 455–57. 
 144.  Bremer, supra note 134, at 1123. 
 145.  Hirsch, supra note 137, at 458–59. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Bremer, supra note 134, at 1123–24. 
 148.  Hirsch, supra note 137, at 465. 
 149. See Freeman, supra note 7, at 559–60, 671–73; Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 371–
404. 
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private sector on one end—for example, in the form of government-certified 
codes of conduct—to informal convening, nudging, and “responsive 
regulation” on the other. To some degree, many systems that might at first 
be characterized as hard-law regulation are, in fact, systems of collaborative 
governance. 
By involving the private sector and other third parties, collaborative 
governance can purportedly (1) increase the amount of private sector 
expertise in governance, (2) contribute to the perceived legitimacy of 
governance, thus contributing to increased compliance, (3) harness 
nongovernmental mechanisms towards compliance and enforcement, thus 
increasing the state’s enforcement capacity, and (4) solve pacing problems 
by shifting from onetime, specific rules to an ongoing, iterative system of 
monitoring and compliance.150 Collaborative governance can thus, in theory 
at least, address many of the regulatory challenges posed by algorithmic 
decision-making.151 It has been touted as well suited to governing complex, 
changing, and risky systems, including those in the field of privacy law.152 
Rather than attempting to dictate in specific, detailed legal rules precisely 
how to prevent the problems of algorithmic error, bias, and discrimination, 
the state could structure, against a backdrop of significant state enforcement 
resources, a system of delegation to and oversight over the private sector in 
coming up with contextually appropriate solutions and maintaining ongoing 
compliance with the regulatory regime.153 These solutions could address 
problems that arise at an early design stage and could create ongoing 
oversight and refinement.  
 
 150. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 137, at 467. 
 151. Guihot and others make a similar argument with respect to responsive risk regulation, and W. 
Nicholson Price II has argued this in the context of black box medicine. See supra note 8. 
 152. See KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND 12–13 
(2015); COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY 121–22 (Ashgate 
Publ’g Ltd. 2003); Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 141, at 480; Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? 
Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and the Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 83, 98–99, 157; Dennis D. Hirsch, supra note 137, at 464–67; Margot E. Kaminski, When the 
Default Is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the NTIA, 94 DENVER L. REV. 925, 927 n.11, 947–48 
(2016); Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 I/S: 
J.L. POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 355, 413–14 (2011); David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. 
L. REV. 329, 343 n.69, 367–70 (2014). See generally COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA 
PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992) (comparing computer 
privacy laws in the United States, Britain, West Germany, and Sweden); Kenneth A. Bamberger & 
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) (discussing 
the convergence of corporate privacy practices); Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309 (2015) (suggesting a performance-based consumer law approach). 
 153. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2038 
(2005) (describing three stages: “the setting, implementation, and enforcement (including monitoring) of 
standards”). 
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However, collaborative governance is subject to many of the same 
capture concerns as self-regulation. Accountability thus is the key to a 
successful collaborative governance regime. I argue that characterizing the 
systemic governance prong of algorithmic accountability as collaborative 
governance more fully captures the kinds of accountability necessary for 
addressing instrumental concerns about algorithmic decision-making. It also 
highlights that while most scholars have been focusing on a first-order 
accountability problem (ensuring that an algorithm is being overseen by 
impartial but expert outsiders), they have failed to identify the second-order 
accountability problem (ensuring that these delegated processes of 
governance remain accountable to society at large).154 
Accountability in a collaborative governance regime looks different and 
serves different goals from the individualized transparency of due process. 
Rather than protecting individual dignity or providing individualized 
justification, accountability in a collaborative governance regime attempts to 
ensure that private sector involvement in public governance both 
substantively serves public goals and is procedurally legitimate.155 
In other words, the problem of algorithmic accountability is not just 
about letting a team of external computer scientists see the source code and 
data set and play with the algorithm. It is also about, for example, putting in 
place independence requirements that ensure those engineers do not get later 
hired by that company, putting in place processes for those engineers to 
report problems to a regulator or to the public, and putting in place 
opportunities for stakeholders to have oversight over, or at least input into, 
decisions made by these engineers. The first kind of accountability (letting 
engineers see the source code) is concerned about oversight over how the 
algorithm functions. The second (requiring independence or putting in place 
ways for those engineers to trigger public reactions or regulatory 
enforcement) is concerned with the legitimacy of the collaborative 
governance system—of delegating substantive decisions about policy to 
private actors—as a whole.  
 
 154. Kaminski, supra note 12, (manuscript at 21–23) (describing “first order” and “second order” 
accountability issues). 
 155. This resonates with Danielle Citron’s important point that algorithmic governance is not just 
about individual due process but also about creating overall accountability towards setting the rules of an 
algorithmic system. See Citron, supra note 14, at 1302–03. 
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2.  The Collaborative Governance Toolkit 
As discussed, collaborative governance is not the same thing as self-
regulation or deregulation.156 Collaborative governance shifts from 
commanding private actors to structuring both collaboration with and 
delegation to them.157 I discuss a number of the available tools here. 
First there is, crucially, still room for command-and-control 
government in collaborative governance.158 State-set prohibitions and 
parameters can ensure that both lawmaking and compliance do not move too 
far from the public good.159 Additionally, the state can and should use 
traditional enforcement when necessary to incentivize private participation 
in both rule setting and compliance against the background threat of a 
regulatory hammer (what I and others have referred to as a “penalty default,” 
drawing on the literature on private ordering).160 Thus, for example, the state 
might set a broad rule that algorithmic decision-making should not 
discriminate and issue significant fines when a particular algorithmic 
decision-making system produces discriminatory results. 
Coupled with a traditional command-and-control approach, a 
collaborative governance regime mixes soft and hard law along multiple 
axes.161 The goal is to retain both enough give in the legal system that private 
actors will be incentivized to participate and enough strength in the system 
that they are motivated to do so towards the public good. Collaborative 
governance tools range from the more to the less formal and deploy more or 
less government involvement. More formal “coregulatory” methods include 
negotiated rulemaking,162 legal safe harbors to encourage the adoption of 
 
 156. See supra Introduction. 
 157. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 386 (“Regulators no longer command, they delegate.”); Lobel, 
The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 377 (“[T]he role of government changes from regulator and controller 
to facilitator, and law becomes a shared problem-solving process rather than an ordering activity.”). 
 158. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 452. 
 159. See id. at 371. 
 160. Kaminski, supra note 152, at 943–45; Price, supra note 8, at 466. This idea appears throughout 
the literature but is not explicitly identified as a penalty default. David Dana, The New “Contractarian” 
Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 47; Freeman, supra note 6, at 666 (“The 
background threat of regulation by an agency can provide the necessary motivation for effective and 
credible self-regulation.”); see also Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 452 (quoting Dana, supra) 
(“[C]ommand-and-control regulation is a precondition for contractarian regulation” as “actors that 
recognize the possibility of regulation . . . have an incentive to voluntarily reach a cooperative 
agreement.”) (referring to David Dana’s “contractarian regulation”). 
 161. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 388–95. 
 162. Cf. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 34–35, 42–
51 (1982) (stating that coregulatory methods are less formal than rulemaking). 
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industry codes of conduct,163 and the incorporation by reference of technical 
standards.164 In these formal methods of collaborative governance, it is clear 
that the government’s goal is structured delegation to or collaboration with 
the private sector. 
Less formal methods of collaborative governance include audited self-
regulation,165 informally “delegating” the interpretation of broader standards 
to private actors,166 applying performance standards instead of specific 
rules,167 and encouraging private ordering in response to unappealing 
defaults crafted in the law.168 These less formal methods may escape 
identification as collaborative governance tactics or, indeed, may not be 
deliberately collaborative on the part of the government at all. But they 
perform collaborative functions by structuring the involvement of the private 
sector in determining the substance or implementation of regulation and in 
overseeing compliance with it. 
There is no one-size-fits-all version of collaborative governance. A 
particular regime will need to be tailored to a particular sector.169 The state 
ideally calibrates a particular collaborative governance system to the features 
of a particular industry, evaluating whether that industry contains repeat 
players, whether its actors are motivated by professional reputation, how 
firms are internally organized, including whether there is an established 
compliance culture, and what kinds of network links exist between actors. 
Extrinsic forms of motivation and accountability can lead to the creation of 
very different kinds of collaborative legal regimes. So can other features of 
the regulatory environment, including whether civil society players are well 
established and well resourced and how great the technical barriers are to 
 
 163. See Rubinstein, supra note 152, at 356–60. 
 164. Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 131, 133–39 (2013). 
 165. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1118–19. 
 166. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 386 (“Regulators no longer command, they delegate.”); Lobel, 
New Governance, supra note 7, at 71 (“[R]egulations are often deliberately ambiguous. Instead of 
regulating the details of behavior, agencies increasingly use broad policy goals such as 'risk management' 
and allow the regulated industries to implement and interpret these mandates.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 152, at 1330. But see Bamberger, supra note 9, at 389 (“Certain 
public problems . . . lend themselves to neither specific behavioral commands nor measurable 
outcomes.”). 
 168. See Bremer, supra note 134, at 1119 (calling these “second-order regulatory agreements . . . 
‘agreements entered into between regulated firms and other private actors in the shadow of public 
regulations’” (quoting Vandenbergh, supra note 153, at 2030)); see also Kristelia A. García, Penalty 
Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2014) (identifying “penalty 
default licenses” and penalty defaults in general as mechanisms for inducing private ordering). 
 169. Jody Freeman refers to this approach as “microinstitutional[ism].” Freeman, supra note 6, at 
674. 
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participation by third parties. 
i.  The Problem of Accountability 
Relying on the private sector and private third parties for rule-setting, 
implementation, and enforcement, however, creates a significant problem: a 
lack of accountability.170 Critics observe that such a regime can easily 
become subject to collusion or capture.171 Collaborative governance in its 
worst form becomes a way for powerful companies to cement their power 
and evade regulation and oversight.172 Governance mechanisms can become 
an “enablement paradigm” instead of an “empowerment paradigm,” with 
purported accountability tactics providing a fig leaf that legitimizes bad 
behavior and does not mitigate it.173 
Accountability is thus the central problem of collaborative 
governance.174 Accountability can mean many things.175 Accountability is 
not synonymous with transparency. Transparency involves structuring 
information flows—to the public, to experts, and to affected third parties. 
But an accountable collaborative governance regime is not necessarily a 
publicly transparent regime; nor is public transparency alone sufficient for 
establishing accountability. The collaborative governance literature is filled 
with calls for public transparency.176 But it also contains skepticism, 
 
 170. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 384 (“[D]ecisions assigned to regulated firms should also be 
viewed through an accountability lens.”). 
 171. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 55–56. 
 172. Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 458–59 (“A central challenge for the governance 
model is therefore to understand how collaborative environments can be nurtured to produce equitable 
results, especially in settings where vast power imbalances exist.”). 
 173. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 429 (“[T]he establishment of auditable controls often provides 
firms with ways to signal legitimacy without addressing deeper problems inherent in existing routines 
and structures.”); Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 385 (fearing that collaborative techniques will 
be "used by management merely as mechanisms for monitoring, controlling, and exerting additional 
pressures on workers"). 
 174. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1229, 1236–37 (2003) (identifying “accountability as the central issue requiring inventive work” 
in public-private roles). 
 175. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 404; Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 6–23 (providing an overview 
of accountability problems in both the public and private sectors); Minow, supra note 174, at 1260 
(“Accountability . . . means being answerable to authority that can mandate desirable conduct and 
sanction conduct that breaches identified obligations.”). 
 176. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 407 (“[A] certain level of decisional transparency [is] essential to 
permitting meaningful review.”); Bremer, supra note 134, at 1124 (“[A] private governance system 
should be transparent, so that both its participants and products are knowable to a public that may be 
affected by that system.”); Freeman, supra note 6, at 635 (“As in other contexts, mandatory disclosure 
could serve as one among other accountability mechanisms.”); Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 
454 (“[G]overnance embraces the essential significance of transparency and information disclosure.”); 
Minow, supra note 174, at 1263 (“Democratic governments promise accountability through transparency, 
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including acknowledgments that accountability necessarily involves both 
enforcement mechanisms and expert analysis, in addition to public 
knowledge and engagement.177 This observation resonates with the literature 
on algorithmic accountability, which more recently downplays public 
transparency in favor of expert oversight.178 But it also pushes back against 
more recent attempts to establish regulatory or expert oversight without any 
public or third-party transparency. 
Accountability in the context of collaborative governance has been 
characterized as “checks on decision making” targeted at producing 
legitimacy—that is, the public acceptability of a system.179 Accountability 
involves both substantive and procedural goals. An accountable regime 
produces substantively good regulation, in the name of the public good rather 
than private interests.180 At the same time, an accountable collaborative 
governance regime maintains procedural norms about fair decision-making 
to produce public acceptance of private involvement in governance.181 This 
can be understood as a concern about justification, in that it addresses the 
perceived and real legitimacy of a decision-making system—not just the 
algorithm, but the public-private partnerships around it. 
In practice, accountability can take a variety of forms. Accountability 
can take the form of participation and process requirements at the rulemaking 
stage—for example, by requiring that an industry consult with civil society 
 
a trendy term for public disclosure of key decisions and the information necessary to assess those 
decisions.”).  
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 179. Freeman, supra note 6, at 664–66. 
 180. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 403 (defining accountability in terms of regulatory goals as 
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of a private governance regime”). 
  
1568 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1529 
or external experts in coming up with policies or codes of conduct.182 For 
example, the company Axon (formerly TASER), the world’s largest 
producer of body-worn police cameras, established an AI Ethics Board 
featuring academics and private sector actors, in the shadow of efforts to 
regulate algorithmic decision-making in New York City.183 Absent input by 
affected stakeholders and public transparency, the efficacy and legitimacy of 
this board has been much questioned, as have other attempts at AI ethics 
boards at other companies.184 
A central aim of collaborative governance is to produce a more effective 
compliance culture.185 Thus accountability can also take the form of 
structuring industry self-assessment,186 by requiring the appointment of 
independent compliance officers187 and requiring ongoing internal 
reports.188 Accountability can also involve independent oversight over a 
company’s behavior, such as third-party auditors or civil society assessments 
of whether a company is actually behaving as it said it would.189 
Collaborative governance emphasizes systemic accountability, or 
aggregate accountability, which looks at the interplay between different 
accountability mechanisms, over time.190 It does not rely, as the algorithmic 
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 190. Freeman, supra note 6. 
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accountability literature largely does, on just one or two individual 
accountability mechanisms.  Enacting whistleblower protections by itself is 
not enough. Requiring an algorithmic impact assessment by itself is not 
enough. To achieve aggregate accountability in a collaborative governance 
regime, regulators must put mechanisms in place to ensure balanced and 
expert input and oversight over all three stages of governance: rule-setting, 
implementation, and enforcement. And the designer of the regulatory system 
must be particularly aware of how these mechanisms interact as a whole. 
This requires designing multiple accountability mechanisms so that they feed 
back into each other at different stages of regulation.191 
For example, self-assessment or third-party auditing to ensure that an 
algorithmic decision-making system is not biased might be released to a 
regulator that in turn summarizes such results and publishes them to the 
public.192 The public could then respond by avoiding a particular industry or 
company (by deploying both shaming and a market mechanism as soft 
enforcement) or by putting pressure on the regulator to enforce the law. Or 
the public could respond to composite reports of particularly egregious 
behavior by a sector of industry by voting to create new laws that will then 
be newly implemented by a company, which in turn would be assessed by 
third-party auditors. Thus the governance system iterates. Merely putting in 
place a stand-alone auditing requirement would not achieve this regulatory 
iteration, nor achieve accountability over the use of private-public 
partnerships to govern. 
Recharacterizing the conversation about algorithmic accountability as 
a conversation about collaborative governance thus lets us draw on work that 
the literature has already done. Rather than debating the value of 
individualized transparency or of public disclosure, we can turn efforts 
towards structuring an effective and accountable governance regime qua 
regime. And rather than deploying accountability mechanisms one at a time, 
we can more seriously begin to address how they interact in a system of 
governance as a whole. 
 
 191. Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 425 n.351. 
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3.  The Collaborative Governance of Algorithms 
There are aspects of algorithmic decision-making that make it well 
suited to collaborative governance.193 Algorithmic decision-making involves 
complex systems that are better suited to regulation at earlier stages of 
design,194 are constantly changing over time, require a high level of technical 
expertise, have goals that are often articulated in terms of risk management, 
and have regulatory goals that are not easily measured or precisely defined. 
Moreover, algorithmic decision-making challenges at least some aspects of 
our legal system such that, absent substantive legal changes, individual 
challenges under existing laws may fail.195 
Much of the literature on algorithmic accountability ports in various 
techniques from collaborative governance, but without recognizing that it is 
deploying collaborative governance and without an eye to building systemic 
accountability for the governance regime itself. This means that it too lightly 
dismisses public transparency, stakeholder input, and individual process as 
aspects of producing a legitimate systemic regime. 
This Article produces two important insights for the existing literature 
on algorithmic governance. First many of the policy recommendations in that 
literature are, in fact, techniques from the collaborative governance toolkit. 
Auditing,196 expert input both individually and through expert boards,197 
impact assessments,198 documentation,199 creating public interest causes of 
action,200 and whistle-blower protections201 are, in fact, techniques deployed 
in collaborative governance. Situating this conversation in the collaborative 
governance literature both broadens the possible toolkit and makes us take a 
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systemic and governance-based point of view instead of deploying these 
tools one or several at a time. 
Second, understanding that the conversation about accountability in 
algorithmic decision-making is, in fact, largely (though, not entirely) a 
conversation about collaborative governance better frames how we talk 
about transparency. Rather than arguing over the instrumental value of 
individual notice or of publicly releasing source code, we should be 
discussing how to obtain aggregate accountability across a firm’s decision-
making, over time.  
That is, most proposals to date largely delegate the governance of 
algorithmic error, bias, and discrimination to private firms. We need to 
establish accountability over how these firms set rules (determine what 
constitutes “fairness” or “bias” and how to address it) and how they 
implement those rules (ensuring firms deploy the tools they say are necessary 
to solve the problems and that the deployed tools in fact address the 
problems). 
To some extent, analogies to individual procedural due process have 
obscured this point. We impose accountability frameworks on companies 
that deploy decision-making algorithms not just because those technologies 
make decisions that look like the kind of serious decisions that traditionally 
invoked procedural due process. We impose accountability because we 
effectively rely on those firms to come up with and comply with substantive 
rules preventing error, bias, and discrimination.202 Transparency, including 
individual transparency and public transparency of some kind, is a necessary 
component of accountability. But by itself it is not enough.203 Stakeholder 
input, expert oversight, and a real threat of enforcement are also crucial 
aspects of an accountable regime. 
i.  Designing Collaborative Algorithmic Governance 
Collaborative governance is highly context dependent.204 We will need 
to learn far more about the players in algorithmic decision-making, in 
particular contexts, to structure an effective regulatory system. This Section 
represents an initial attempt to outline both a portrait of the sector and what 
 
 202. Citron, supra note 14, at 1288 (“Computer programmers inevitably engage in rulemaking when 
they construct an automated system’s code.”). 
 203. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 984 (“If we recognize that transparency alone cannot 
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an effective collaborative governance regime might look like, with the caveat 
that the development and use of algorithmic decision-making in may look 
significantly different in different sectors. 
First there are indications both of self-organizing and professionalism 
within the industry and related academic circles.205 For example, the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”), an international standard-
setting organization, established the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of 
Autonomous and Intelligent Systems.206 This initiative recently launched the 
second edition of a treatise on ethics in autonomous systems.207 Based on 
this treatise, the IEEE Standards Association is actively working on new 
standards related to AI (including a project to help users certify how to 
eliminate bias in algorithms) and also now hosts a number of courses on 
ethics and AI. 
Outside of the IEEE, computer scientists are having robust 
conversations about algorithmic accountability and explainability and how 
to make such systems intelligible to individuals. One recent paper identified 
nearly 300 core papers on explainable systems, with over 12,000 citing 
papers in the literature.208 A growing annual, multidisciplinary conference 
on fairness, accountability, and transparency in machine learning209 has, as 
of 2018, joined the Association for Computing Machinery, an international 
computing society and resource for computing professionals, embedding it 
in the computing profession. One key question, however, is how much of 
algorithmic decision-making will be built by established players and 
professionals versus be deployed by smaller startups or by users potentially 
less situated in the developing professional community. 
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There is a growing array of civil society actors concerned with 
algorithmic decision-making, at least in the United States. Well-established 
civil liberties organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
Center for Democracy and Technology, or the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, could participate in rule-setting or monitoring around 
algorithmic decision-making. So could existing nonprofits, such as the 
Southern Poverty Law Center or the American Civil Liberties Union, that 
address related substantive concerns, including discrimination and civil 
rights. Newer AI-focused organizations also have the potential for 
involvement in a collaborative governance regime.210 These third-party 
actors could be used in oversight mechanisms like expert boards or to 
double-check auditing or in more formal negotiations of codes of conduct. 
They will, however, likely need additional support and resources for 
developing technological expertise and capacity.211 
Given both the increasing professionalization of the field and the array 
of possible third-party actors, a collaborative approach to algorithmic 
accountability might work in practice. How, then, might the regime be 
structured? 
First we would need to establish clear liability for the kinds of failures 
or systemic problems that we want to avoid—establishing it in broader 
standards rather than specific rules, but bounding those standards to remain 
tethered to the public interest, so companies cannot exploit limitless 
flexibility.212 We would need to create a forceful mechanism for enforcing 
these standards, whether through an existing agency, such as the FTC (which 
currently addresses privacy harms through a consumer protection approach), 
or through private rights of action or actions by federal prosecutors or state 
attorneys general.213 There would need to be a strong “penalty default” in 
place: a real threat of significant fines, like the GDPR’s 4 percent of 
worldwide revenue. And the government agency responsible for 
enforcement would have to issue fines often enough to scare private industry 
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to the negotiating table or into establishing a real compliance regime. The 
worldwide rush of companies to create internal compliance regimes to 
comply with the GDPR suggests that its level of fines might be working at 
doing just that. In the U.S. context, something would need to change. As I 
have noted elsewhere, “[W]hat penalties there are in U.S. privacy law are not 
high enough, or likely enough to be enforced against a particular industry 
actor, to drive participation by most of the industry actors with whom the 
government wants to co-regulate.”214 
Against the backdrop of potential enforcement, we could either 
formally create the opportunity to negotiate safe harbors in the form of codes 
of conduct, with transparency to and input from at least third-party 
stakeholders if not the public. Or, more informally, we could encourage 
private actors to fill in the details of compliance in their particular context, 
subject to independent monitoring (what Kenneth Bamberger refers to as 
“regulation as delegation”).215 We could encourage the creation of 
certification mechanisms to create private standards and systems of 
compliance216 and have agencies issue guidance and convene workshops to 
establish best practices in the field.217 
We could require the establishment of professional and independent 
“algorithmic decision-making officers”—that is, compliance officers—in 
companies that deploy algorithmic decision-making. Or we could craft a safe 
harbor from liability for companies that install such officers.218 We could 
require companies to both make substantive commitments about their 
systems and create impact assessments before their deployment.219 We could 
require those impact assessments to clearly describe the system, detail 
decisions around its design, address risk-mitigation measures, establish 
potential benchmarks, and detail considered but rejected alternatives.220 We 
could require periodic reporting or performance assessments, either to a 
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government agency, to an independent expert board, or to the public.221 We 
could instruct a government agency, such as the FTC, to release regular 
industry-wide assessments to the public.  
We could establish mandatory third-party auditing both during training 
and as a company runs the model.222 We could require companies to include 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) or other experts on internal 
oversight panels, revealing deeper information to these internal boards than 
to the public, potentially including both source code and data sets.223 This is 
particularly important because the instrumental goals of algorithmic 
governance are not just technical, but have a significant normative-legal 
component; engineers should not be defining “discrimination” or “fairness” 
without extensive conversation with lawyers and impacted community 
members.224 We could establish whistleblower protections for employees 
who reveal bad actions in case corporate compliance culture misaligns with 
public goals or outright fails.225 
To encourage and enable private actor enforcement, we could explicitly 
award standing to third parties for a cause of action against the behavior we 
want to prevent.226 We could award attorneys’ fees or create other kinds of 
monetary incentives.227 Federal agencies, again such as the FTC, could serve 
in a capacity-enhancing role, hiring technologists and conducting relevant 
research to aid NGOs and other private actors. 
If these proposals sound familiar, it is because they have been peppered 
across more recent contributions to the algorithmic governance literature. 
They have not, however, been brought together as a whole. Nor has there 
been much conversation about how different levers of accountability at 
different stages—rule-setting versus implementation versus compliance or 
enforcement—might feed back into each other.228 For example, a company 
with an internal compliance officer might produce reports to an agency that 
could then publish summary reports to the public, which might respond by 
avoiding the company in the market, pressuring the agency to issue new best 
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practices, pressuring legislators to produce new laws, or putting resources 
behind civil society groups that could end up participating on oversight 
boards of companies and contributing to the impact assessment process. If 
there is no disclosure at any point to persons outside the company or 
regulatory body, then the aspect of collaborative governance that harnesses 
or even relies on the power of third parties in both setting publicly oriented 
rules and producing compliance with them will fail. 
In designing a system of collaborative governance for algorithmic 
decision-making, then, we should be considering the system as a whole, not 
introducing standalone mechanisms. Tools such as audits without a threat of 
enforcement, impact assessments with no public transparency, even 
oversight boards without the ability to enforce or, at least, report out (whether 
to a regulator or the public) that are deployed individually do not create an 
effective or legitimate governance regime. 
ii.  Potential Pitfalls 
There are significant hurdles and costs to such a system, beyond the 
more general problem of passing legislation through Congress, and beyond 
the problem of capture discussed at length above.229 Some of these apply to 
collaborative governance systems in general, but others may be more 
specific to algorithmic governance. 
There are problems to creating and enforcing broad, behavioral 
standards rather than specific rules.230 Companies may mishandle the 
delegation implied in standards, either intentionally or unintentionally. 
Standards can be in tension with rule-of-law values about fair notice of 
prohibited conduct by the law.231 We would have to be wary of producing 
unfettered agency discretion.232 And there are costs to delaying the creation 
of specific rules proscribing bad conduct, as companies escape liability by 
arguing that a standard is too vague.233 
Collaborative governance can favor incumbents who can afford to 
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participate in rule-setting, potentially producing rules that favor them and 
disfavor newer industry actors. It may also disfavor smaller enterprises that 
can ill afford to take on compliance costs and culture. And if the field indeed 
proves to be highly heterogeneous, then creating a collaborative governance 
regime tailored to different subsectors may end up proving extraordinarily 
costly to administer.234 
One of the paradoxes of collaborative governance is that precisely those 
subject matter areas that the approach would be best suited to—newer 
technologies, complex and evolving technologies—are those areas that for 
other reasons may be least suited to it.235 If there is a lack of a culture of 
professionalism, big gaps between established players and new entrants, and 
a lack of consensus within and between industry and outside players, 
collaborative governance can be extremely challenging to implement. 
A final and important criticism of collaborative governance regimes is 
that they are ill-suited to determining the content of human rights. Unless we 
are very, very careful to delineate the outer limits of what may be negotiated, 
we may find private companies reasoning away rights protections in their 
rule-setting or implementation of standards. This brings us back to why 
binary governance is binary—why we need not just collaborative 
governance but a system of individual rights as well. 
C.  COMBINING THE TWO APPROACHES 
A systemic collaborative governance regime has important benefits 
over other regulatory approaches in addressing instrumental concerns about 
algorithmic decision-making. It addresses some but not all classes of 
justificatory concerns about the legitimacy of the system. It does not, 
however, adequately address dignitary concerns, nor address justificatory 
concerns about particular individual decisions. For that reason, we need to 
additionally establish a system of individual rights. 
While collaborative governance is centrally concerned with 
accountability, the kinds of accountability that it produces are not always 
coextensive with the kinds of accountability we require in the context of due 
process owed to individuals. Collaborative governance may produce a 
regime that is adequately accountable and legitimate when it comes to 
producing rules that govern algorithmic systems, but not adequately 
accountable and legitimate when it comes to justifying individual decisions. 
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A system of governance through third-party audits, expert boards, 
government inspection and enforcement, and performance reports might 
produce better and more legitimate algorithms, but it might still not produce 
a justificatory system that would be acceptable from the perspective of an 
individual affected by a particular decision. 
Yet as noted above,236 individual rights, especially individual rights 
invoked ex post and triggered by a particular decision, will not be the best 
way to create more accountable companies, improve management culture, 
and correct algorithmic design. Thus to effectively govern algorithmic 
decision-making, we need both. The two parts of this system, however, will 
interact in complex ways. 
1.  The Two Systems as Complementary 
In some aspects, the two parts of a binary system of governance will be 
complementary. Individual rights can produce instrumental contributions, be 
an important component of systemic accountability, give substance to the 
rules in a collaborative governance regime, and address one of the problems 
of using collaborative governance in this particular area—that oversight and 
transparency can produce additional individual privacy harms. Collaborative 
governance can, in turn, contribute deeper layers of accountability towards 
justificatory goals than a system reliant just on individual rights. 
Collaborative governance could help us define how rights will be 
implemented in a particular technological setting. 
First, individual rights can complement collaborative governance by 
addressing individualized error, bias, and discrimination. As discussed 
above,237 individual rights can help uncover and fix instrumental problems 
with algorithmic decision-making. Individuals are best situated to know 
when profiles contain factual error or erroneous inferences. Additionally, 
individual narratives about discrimination or bias may be more palatable to 
the public than agency-produced reports or statistics, and could feed back 
into collaborative governance by contributing to ongoing policy 
conversations about the broader governance regime. 
Second, individual rights can be an important aspect of systemic 
accountability. Proponents of collaborative governance might, in fact, be 
surprised to see individual participation and process characterized as distinct 
from aggregate accountability.238 Individual enforcement is quintessentially 
 
 236. See supra Section II.B. 
 237. See id.  
 238. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 6, at  587, 622 (referring to individual hearings). 
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collaborative—it spreads the cost of obtaining compliance from the 
government to private actors. And putting in place an individual right to 
contest an algorithmic decision, or to obtain an explanation, or to obtain a 
human in the loop could contribute to management reform within a company, 
encouraging the establishment of compliance personnel or complimentary 
review processes. 
Third, individual rights can provide a check on substantive rule-setting 
by private actors. The law might require, for example, that individuals be 
given an explanation of an algorithmic decision, but leave it to private actors 
to implement precisely what that explanation constitutes in practice. Making 
this an individual right, rather than just a company duty, could ensure that 
there is individual or even judicial review of any implementation. Individual 
rights, in other words, can provide the substantive backstop for company 
rule-setting, by subjecting rules or implementations to challenges, 
potentially subject to judicial review. This potentially brings courts into 
collaborative governance as important players that are more insulated from 
politics and take into account both human rights regimes and fairness 
concerns. 
Fourth, an individualized disclosure regime could address one of the 
central challenges to deploying collaborative governance in this space: that 
releasing large amounts of information to the public threatens individual 
privacy, among other informational interests.239 Collaborative governance 
requires extensive monitoring and disclosure, but broader public disclosure 
of profiles and personal inferences raises serious privacy concerns. Allowing 
individuals to obtain this information produces oversight without necessarily 
passing personal information on to the public. Relatedly, using collaborative 
governance instead of command-and-control governance means that 
information may be passed on to private third parties for oversight purposes 
rather than to the government itself—which matters to the extent that we 
want to protect individual privacy from government surveillance. 
An accountable collaborative governance regime can also complement 
individual procedural rights. Establishing systemic accountability in a 
collaborative governance regime can bolster individual rights by providing 
oversight in the name of affected individuals. Making a collaborative 
governance regime systemically accountable also does work towards making 
it individually justifiable.  
This interaction of types of accountability envisions several types of 
 
 239. See Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 658. 
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differently purposed but complementary information flows.240 Individuals 
may be provided with a simplified and understandable explanation of 
algorithmic decision-making, giving them insight into whether a decision is 
justified in their respective cases, at the same time that third-party auditors 
assure them that the system, as a whole, is not biased or unjustifiable. 
Moreover, a system of collaborative governance could bolster the ability of 
individuals to enforce rights by producing an aggregate picture that can root 
out systemic bias, when one-off, individual narratives might not.241 
Finally, we could use collaborative governance to implement individual 
rights. Several scholars have, for example, suggested that algorithmic due 
process should require notice to individuals that allows them to tinker with 
an algorithmic decision-making system through an easily comprehensible 
interface.242 This is quintessentially a collaborative governance problem: we 
would not want lawmakers to write specific and soon-outdated rules 
dictating what such a system must look like. Instead, the law might put in 
place a broad notice requirement, coupled with agency guidance, or a safe 
harbor for those coming up and complying with a government-approved 
industry code of conduct. As discussed in Part III, there is some evidence 
that just such a process is beginning to take place in the EU.243 
2.  The Two Systems in Tension 
The two systems will also, however, be in tension. An individual rights 
regime can conflict with system-wide accuracy and bias. Second, a strong 
individual rights regime may restrict regulators’ abilities to deploy 
“responsive regulation”—that is, to calibrate enforcement measures up or 
down in order to properly incentivize private collaboration.244 Third, 
establishing accountability in a collaborative governance regime can raise 
individual privacy concerns. Fourth, where systemic and individual 
accountability can be complementary, there is also a danger of confusing one 
kind of accountability for another and crafting a system that is accountable 
along only one axis. And finally, while collaborative governance can do 
 
 240. See, e.g., Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 983 (“Holding an assemblage accountable 
requires not just seeing inside any one component . . . but understanding how it works as a system.”); 
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 18–29; Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 711. 
 241. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1130−33. 
 242. See supra note 105. 
 243. Jef Ausloos et al., Position Paper Presented at CHI 2018: Algorithmic Transparency and 
Accountability in Practice (Jan. 2018), https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5a2007a24a11ce000164d272/ 
5ac883392c10d1baaa4358f2_Algorithmic_Transparency_and_Accountability_in_Practice_CameraRea
dy.pdf. 
 244. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, 4–7. 
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important work in the implementation of fundamental rights or human rights, 
there is also danger in letting private parties do interpretative work instead 
of courts or lawmakers. 
A system of individual rights can conflict with system-wide accuracy 
and system-wide concerns about bias. Individuals could use correction and 
erasure rights to intentionally game a decision-making algorithm, by 
changing or eliminating negative information about themselves.245 Even just 
opting out of a system without actively introducing inaccuracies can affect 
system bias. For example, if only well-educated, socioeconomically elite 
individuals opt out, then the contours of a machine learning system would 
come to reflect those who are less empowered and remain within it. Allowing 
individuals to alter or erase their information changes the data set, which 
changes the algorithm going forward. There are thus real tensions between 
attending to individual dignitary or autonomy concerns on the one hand, and 
addressing systemic bias and discrimination on the other.246 
Second, a strong individual rights regime may prove to be too much of 
a hammer. If collaborative governance relies on the ability of regulators to 
soften regulation as an incentive for coming to the table, then giving 
enforceable rights to individuals may remove that incentive. Companies 
might decide not to take on the cost of participating in collaborative 
governance, since they may end up facing costly individual legal challenges 
after all. 
A third point of tension, mentioned above,247 is that collaborative 
governance centrally requires extensive monitoring and information 
disclosure. Individual privacy concerns push back against this. So do other 
informational interests, ranging from business interests in trade secrets to 
security concerns.248 But there is a central problem with hinging a 
collaborative governance regime not on disclosure to the public but on 
disclosure to individuals. Not all individuals will invoke their individual 
rights; individually targeted disclosure will function selectively based on 
access to justice, cost, and both legal and technical expertise. A collaborative 
governance regime with minimal public disclosure would, as we see below 
in the example of the GDPR,249 need to carefully calibrate all of its other 
accountability mechanisms in order to function. 
 
 245. See Bambauer & Zarsky, supra note 118, at 34–43. 
 246. Id. at 23–32; Hildebrandt, supra note 14, at 48–49; see Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1505–10. 
 247. See supra Section II.C.1.  
 248. PASQUALE, supra note 118, at 12, 193; Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 639. 
 249. See infra Part III.  
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Fourth, there is a danger of confusing the two kinds of justificatory 
requirements entwined in a dual system. Individual justification requires 
information that is legible to an ordinary individual.250 But systemic 
accountability requires other kinds of checks, including deep disclosure to 
experts and monitoring by third parties.251 Just because a binary system is 
“transparent” along one axis does not mean it is transparent along others. A 
system might adequately justify itself for purposes of producing individual 
decisions but not for purposes of producing legitimate rules about preventing 
system-wide discrimination, or vice versa. A binary system should, thus, be 
assessed towards both individual and systemic accountability goals. 
Finally, collaborative governance can be dangerous when applied to the 
substance of fundamental rights.252 Companies are not courts; nor are they 
agents of the federal government. They do not have individuals’ best 
interests in mind, nor are they bound by constitutional norms. When 
addressing serious human rights concerns, we must be careful not to use 
collaborative governance tactics towards producing accountability measures 
that function as enablement regimes. 
III.  THE TWO FACES OF THE GDPR 
In the United States, despite repeated calls for transparency and 
accountability,253 the policy landscape around algorithmic decision-making 
remains largely a blank slate.254 Some requirements apply to some 
government use of algorithms,255 but the United States lacks general law to 
govern private sector and many government uses of algorithmic decision-
 
 250. See, e.g., Gianclaudio Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated 
Decision-Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 243, 248–
50 (2017); see also Kaminski, supra note 86, at 213. 
 251. PASQUALE, supra note 118, at 56–58. 
 252. See, e.g., CHRISTINA ANGELOPOULOS ET AL., INST. FOR INFO. LAW, STUDY OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS LIMITATIONS FOR ONLINE ENFORCEMENT THROUGH SELF-REGULATION 52 (2015), 
https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/8763808/IVIR_Study_Online_enforcement_through_self_regulation.pdf. 
 253. See, e.g., Publications, AI NOW INST., https://ainowinstitute.org/reports.html (last visited Sept. 
3, 2019). 
 254. Margot E. Kaminski & Andrew D. Selbst, Opinion, The Legislation That Targets the Racist 
Impacts of Tech, N.Y. TIMES: THE PRIVACY PROJECT (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
05/07/opinion/tech-racism-algorithms.html (discussing Senator Wyden, Senator Booker, and 
Representative Clarke’s proposal); DJ Pangburn, Washington Could Be the First State To Rein In 
Automated Decision-Making, FAST CO. (Feb. 8 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90302465/wash 
ington-introduces-landmark-algorithmic-accountability-laws (discussing proposed Washington state law, 
now off the table); Powles, supra note 183 (discussing a New York attempt at legislation, later watered 
down); see also supra note 4. 
 255. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1507–09. 
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making.256 
In Europe, however, this is not the case. The GDPR went into direct 
effect on member states in May 2018. The GDPR governs processing of 
personal data and applies to both the government and the private sector. The 
GDPR contains an elaborate algorithmic accountability regime. 
For the most part, the focus of the conversation about algorithmic 
accountability in the GDPR has been on the individual rights regime and, 
even more narrowly, on the so-called “right to explanation” of individual 
algorithmically made decisions.257 This Article calls attention instead to the 
binary nature of the GDPR. I argue that the GDPR is both a system of 
individual rights and a complex compliance regime that, when applied to the 
private sector, is constituted through collaborative governance.258 The 
GDPR relies on both formal and informal tactics to create public-private 
partnerships in governing algorithmic decision-making.259 
 
 256. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5. 
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PROTECTION L. REV. 433, 444 (2018); Maja Brkan, Do Algorithms Rule the World? Algorithmic 
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This observation matters for three reasons. First, it matters because the 
GDPR contains not just a system of individual rights that can be invoked 
after an algorithm is deployed, but an approach to governing algorithmic 
system design from the onset, including the ability to affect the management 
structure in companies.260 Second, this characterization shifts the 
conversation about transparency in the GDPR from being about whether 
individual transparency is necessary or useful to how to structure systemic 
accountability. The question is not just how to make algorithms accountable 
to affected individuals; it is how to hold private companies accountable in 
developing the norms, policies, and technical tools involved in and providing 
oversight over algorithmic decision-making. 
Third, the GDPR’s binary governance approach provides an example 
of how the two prongs of a binary governance system might interact. The 
two systems in the GDPR—individual rights and collaborative 
governance—are, as anticipated, often complementary. But they also may 
prove to be in tension and will require careful calibration, in conversation 
with each other, to be effective at governing algorithmic decision-making. 
Intriguingly the GDPR’s absence of public-facing and stakeholder-facing 
accountability suggests that individual transparency rights may have to serve 
a crucial accountability role in its system of collaborative governance. Thus, 
even for those focused on instrumental rather than dignitary or justificatory 
goals, individual rights in the GDPR may be necessary for producing 
effective systemic regulation, too. 
The GDPR thus provides an illustration of the binary approach to 
algorithmic accountability, in action. As the GDPR is enforced and policies 
develop further over time, the regime will be a useful source of evidence 
about when and whether this approach works in practice. Even now, at early 
stages of implementation, the GDPR’s approach to governing algorithmic 
decision-making provides lessons for the rest of the world.  
 
Technical Standards and the Privacy by Design Standardisation ‘Mandate,’ 8 EUR. J.L. & TECH., no. 1, 
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A.  A PRIMER ON THE GDPR 
First, a note about the GDPR for U.S. readers unfamiliar with the 
regime: The GDPR, like its predecessor the Data Protection Directive, 
creates an extensive data protection regime built primarily around the Fair 
Information Practices (“FIPs”).261 The FIPs originated in the United States 
but have become the international standard for data protection, under the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and now form 
the basis for many countries’ data protection laws.262 Traditionally the FIPs 
establish a number of individual rights, including access, disclosure, and 
correction rights, along with general obligations respecting data gathering, 
storage, and use. The GDPR thus contains a broad assortment of individual 
rights and company obligations that apply beyond algorithmic decision-
making, to personal data processing in general.263 
This Article covers only those aspects of the GDPR that might apply to 
or affect algorithmic decision-making. For a U.S. audience, however, it is 
crucial to understand that the GDPR’s individual rights respecting 
algorithmic decision-making do not stand in isolation. They exist against the 
backdrop of more generally applicable law that applies to data processing.264 
Thus, even if the specific rights that apply to algorithmic decision-making 
prove in practice to be toothless (which does not appear to be the case given 
regulators’ recent interpretations265), other aspects of the GDPR give 
individuals substantial abilities to influence both profiling and consequent 
decision-making, algorithmic or not.266 
 
 261. Article 5 of the GDPR lays out its version of the FIPs principles, which are further elaborated 
in Articles 12 to 23 and elsewhere in the GDPR. These include the following: “lawfulness, fairness and 
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see also id. at 7; Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. 
L.J. 115, 128 (2017). 
 262. SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. 
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Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the 
Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP251 rev.01 (Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Article 29 Data Prot. 
Working Party, Decision-Making]. 
 266. See generally Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265 
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Additionally, U.S. readers may be unfamiliar with the various 
interpretative documents that surround the GDPR and their relative strength. 
This, too, is worth clarifying before delving into substance. The GDPR, as 
regulatory regime, consists of text (the Articles), a preamble (the Recitals), 
and Guidelines from the European Data Protection Board (formerly the 
Article 29 Working Party). Technically the GDPR’s text is the actual law.267 
The Recitals may not create new law; they may, however, be used by courts 
and regulators to interpret the text.268 The European Data Protection Board, 
which consists of data protection authorities (regulators and enforcers) from 
around the EU, issues Guidelines.269 Arguably these Guidelines serve both 
an interpretative and a harmonizing role: they interpret and clarify GDPR 
requirements for affected entities while also indicating how regulators 
around the EU will act.270 Various individual Member State regulators, too, 
issue guidance on how to interpret the GDPR.271 
Throughout this Part, I indicate which of these sources I am citing in 
support of arguments about what the GDPR does or does not require. A good 
amount of the GDPR’s requirements for algorithmic accountability come 
from the Recitals and Guidelines and not directly from the text. This does 
not, however, mean that these requirements are legally toothless, as they are 
used by courts, regulators, and companies to interpret what the text means. 
Additionally, understanding the nature of these sources is necessary for 
understanding the GDPR’s approach of combining layers of harder and 
softer law—that is, the GDPR’s approach to collaborative governance. 
B.  INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
The GDPR contains a number of generally applicable individual rights 
that affect algorithmic decision-making and related profiling, in addition to 
several individual rights specific to algorithmic decision-making. This 
Section provides an overview of the GDPR’s individual rights, dividing them 
into three categories: notification and access rights, checks on data use and 
retention, and Article 22’s version of algorithmic “due process” for “solely 
 
(clarifying the GDPR provisions on profiling and automated decision-making). 
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automated” decisions.272 
1.  Notification and Access Rights 
The GDPR contains a number of individual notification and access 
rights. These are both established in the text of the GDPR273 and interpreted 
into the GDPR, in connection to its consent requirements.274 I will explain 
how these rights and requirements apply in the context of algorithmic 
decision-making and related profiling. 
The GDPR establishes a system of generally applicable notification and 
access rights.275 Upon collecting personal information from an individual, a 
company must provide the purpose for which data is gathered, the recipients 
of the data, and the retention period of the data, among other things.276 
Nearly identical information must be disclosed if a company obtains 
personal data not directly from an individual but from another party.277 
Additionally, the GDPR contains affirmative access rights for 
individuals, including access to the source of the data and a copy of the data 
itself.278 Access rights may be invoked at intervals and give individuals the 
ability to regularly check in about what information a company has about 
them, beyond the moment at which data has originally been obtained. The 
GDPR also addresses how information must be communicated.279 
Information must be communicated “in a concise, transparent, intelligible 
and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language . . . .”280 
These general notification and access rights have ramifications for 
algorithmic accountability. Calls for algorithmic due process, discussed in 
Section II.A above, include calls for access to one’s personal data281 and for 
 
 272. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22, at 46. 
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identifying the sources of personal information.282 Whether obtained through 
notification or through an access request, these kinds of disclosures can help 
address all three categories of concerns about algorithmic decision-making: 
dignitary (they enable an individual to begin the process of protesting 
objectification); justificatory (they can reveal if not the details of a reasoning 
process the factual basis for it); and instrumental (they can help uncover 
error, bias, discrimination, or other kinds of unfairness). 
Profiling as a subcategory of data processing triggers additional rights 
under the GDPR.283 Individuals are entitled to be informed of the existence 
of profiling.284 They are also entitled to be given some information about 
how profiling works (a right to an explanation of profiling, if you will).285 
They are entitled to request the data used as an input into their profiles, to 
request information in the profiles, and to request information on how they 
have been categorized—that is, inferences made about them.286 According 
to the GDPR Guidelines, an individual must be informed of the existence of 
decision-making based on profiling, regardless of whether or not that 
decision-making is solely automated.287 
 
 282. Id.; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 125. 
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(“[W]here the processing involves profiling-based decision making (irrespective of whether it is caught 
by Article 22 provisions), then the fact that the processing is for the purposes of both (a) profiling and (b) 
making a decision based on the profile generated, must be made clear to the data subject.”). 
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Thus even if no automated decision-making takes place, individuals 
have more substantial notification and access rights with respect to profiling 
than they do for data processing writ large. Because personal profiles are 
often the basis of algorithmic decision-making, this has the effect of 
governing algorithmic accountability whether or not a decision has been 
reached. It also has the effect of governing algorithmic accountability 
regardless of how automated the decision-making is. 
Algorithmic decision-making itself, then, triggers yet more notification 
and access rights. A company must proactively notify individuals of the 
existence of solely automated decision-making.288 This is precisely what the 
algorithmic due process literature has called for.289 A company must, 
additionally, with respect to solely automated decision-making provide an 
explanation of the algorithm: “[m]eaningful information about the logic 
involved, as well as the significance and envisaged consequences of such 
processing for the data subject.”290 An individual also has a right to 
affirmatively request access to “meaningful information about the logic 
involved” and information about its significance and consequences.291 
What this information will constitute in practice has been subject to an 
already extensive scholarly debate.292 I note here only that these particular 
disclosure rights appear to be individual-centric, rather than system-
oriented.293 They aim at giving individuals meaningful transparency in order 
to enable other individual rights under the GDPR, such as the right of 
correction or right of contestation.294 They are not expert-centric or aimed at 
providing oversight over the construction, administration, or development of 
an algorithm. But neither are they free of substance, and they appear, 
according to related Guidelines, to require significantly more explanatory 
depth than some have suggested.295 
There is another source of individualized transparency in the GDPR: its 
 
 288. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), at 41–42 (“[T]he 
existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at 
least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the 
envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.”). 
 289. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 28. 
 290. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 14(2)(g), at 42. 
 291. Id. art. 15(1)(h), at 43. 
 292. See supra note 257. 
 293. For more extensive discussion, see generally Kaminski, supra note 86. 
 294. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 27. 
 295. Compare Wachter et al., supra note 62, at 843, with Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, 
Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 25–26. 
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consent requirements.296 Explicit consent is one of the three exceptions to 
the GDPR’s prohibition of automated decision-making.297 For consent to be 
valid, individuals must be making an informed choice; they must 
“understand exactly what they are consenting to . . . .”298 If a company does 
not adequately communicate to an individual both the purpose of data 
processing and information about the use of data for automated decisions, 
then consent may be deemed invalid.299 
This again incentivizes disclosure of a particular kind: the kind 
individuals can meaningfully understand that contributes to individuals’ 
ability to give or withdraw consent under the GDPR. This type of 
transparency is not necessarily conducive to expert oversight over 
algorithmic decision-making systems, but that is not its purpose. While the 
GDPR’s individually oriented transparency provisions may have 
instrumental consequences, their primary objective is to address dignitary 
and justificatory concerns. 
2.  Other Checks on Data Processing 
The GDPR does not just afford individuals transparency rights. It also 
includes substantive prohibitions on particular uses of data, heightened 
protections for certain kinds of data, and a number of FIPs-related individual 
rights beyond transparency. I again discuss these measures here with respect 
to automated decision-making and related profiling. 
First, the GDPR contains substantive prohibitions on certain behavior—
prohibitions that can be characterized as individual rights to not be subjected 
to something. One criticism of the FIPs is that they can be without substance, 
providing individuals the illusion of control, while in practice allowing 
companies to do nearly anything as long as they have gotten individuals to 
click through an agreement.300 The GDPR attempts to provide backstops 
beyond individual control. 
 
 296. See, e.g., Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 12–13. 
 297. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(2)(c), at 46. Regular consent already 
requires a “clear affirmative act[]”; explicit consent is even more stringent, requiring “an express 
statement of consent,” often though not always in writing. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
Consent, supra note 274, at 18. 
 298. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 13. 
 299. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Consent, supra note 274, at 13 (“If the controller 
does not provide accessible information, user control becomes illusory and consent will be an invalid 
basis for processing.”); see also Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, 
at 12−13. 
 300. Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 
952, 964–77 (2017). 
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The GDPR, in fact, prohibits solely algorithmic decision-making.301 
The three exceptions are when such decision-making is necessary to a 
contract (not merely subject to a contract), when member state law 
specifically addresses automated decision-making, and when an individual 
has explicitly consented to it.302 Outside of these three contexts, an individual 
has a right not to be subject to solely algorithmic decision-making. 
There is some discussion of whether the GDPR wholesale prohibits 
automated decision-making about children.303 The applicable Guidelines toe 
an interpretative line, by stating that data protection authorities will protect 
children’s data more strongly.304 The Guidelines suggest that children’s data 
will be subject to fewer than the above three exceptions to the general ban 
on automated decision-making. 
The GDPR throughout creates heightened requirements for certain 
kinds of information, including sensitive information, such as race or 
biometric data,305 referred to as “special categories of personal data . . . .”306 
Special categories of data are, like children’s data, subject to fewer 
exceptions to the ban on automated decision-making. They can be processed 
only subject to explicit consent to processing “for one or more specified 
purposes”307 or when “necessary for reasons of substantial public interest” 
and, even then, only subject to proportionality assessment.308 
Finally, individuals have numerous FIPs-based rights in the GDPR that 
apply to data processing in general and, thus, to algorithmic decision-making 
and profiling.309 For example, an individual has a right to rectification, 
whereby he or she can request the correction of inaccurate personal data, 
 
 301. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 23; see also 
Kaminski, supra note 86, at 196–98 (discussing algorithmic accountability and the GDPR). 
 302. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(2), at 46; Article 29 Data Prot. Working 
Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 23, (interpreting Article 22 as a prohibition). 
 303. The GDPR’s text does not prohibit automated decision-making about children, but Recital 71 
suggests that it nonetheless does (“Such measure should not concern a child”). Council Regulation 
2016/679, supra note 13, at 14.  
 304. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 28–29. 
 305. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 9(2), at 38–39. 
 306. Id. art. 6(4)(c), at 37. 
 307. Id. art. 9(2)(a), at 38, art 22(3), at 46. 
 308. Id. art. 9(2)(g), at 38. 
 309. See, e.g., Lilian Edwards, Data Protection: Enter the General Data Protection Regulation, in 
LAW, POLICY AND THE INTERNET 77, 77−119 (Lilian Edwards ed., 2018); Bart van der Sloot & Frederik 
Zuiderveen Borgesius, The EU General Data Protection Regulation: A New Global Standard for 
Information Privacy 15–17 (Apr. 15, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://bartvander 
sloot.com/onewebmedia/SSRN-id3162987.pdf). 
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including inaccurate inferences.310 Individual rights also include, under some 
circumstances, the infamous right to erasure (or, the “right to be 
forgotten”),311 the right to restriction of processing,312 the right to object,313 
and in the case of information processed subject to consent, the right to under 
certain circumstances withdraw consent to processing. 
The algorithmic due process literature, in fact, refers to a number of 
these rights as necessary aspects of an individual’s opportunity to be 
heard.314 These may not be rights to a hearing in a traditional sense, but they 
give individuals the ability to intervene in data processing—and not just 
solely automated processing—in ways familiar to those steeped in the 
algorithmic due process literature. 
Once again these individual rights serve both dignitary and justificatory 
ends. They allow individuals to participate in the formation of their “data 
double,” including through correction and sometimes deletion of 
information. In allowing this participation, these rights potentially create 
something like a dialogue between the individual and a company about the 
rationale behind algorithmic decisions and other forms of personal profiling 
and data processing. They serve instrumental purposes, particularly towards 
correcting factual and inferential errors. But they do not allow for the 
intervention of third-party experts or create a systemic governance regime. 
3.  Individual Algorithmic “Due Process” Under Article 22 
The GDPR explicitly contains a version of algorithmic due process. 
This significant development has been thus far overshadowed by the debate 
about the so-called “right to explanation” of individual algorithmic 
decisions. The GDPR’s Article 22 establishes not just the much-discussed 
“right to explanation” but less discussed due process-like rights to human 
intervention, to express an opinion, and to contest an algorithmic decision.315 
Elsewhere, I have referred to Article 22 as stronger, broader, and deeper than 
its predecessor in the Data Protection Directive, Article 15.316 
 
 310. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 16, at 43 (establishing the rectification right); 
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 17–18 (discussing profiling on 
output data versus input data). 
 311. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 17, at 43–44.  
 312. Id. art. 18, at 44–45. 
 313. Id. art. 21, at 45–46. 
 314. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 28; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 126–
27. 
 315. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22, at 46. 
 316. Kaminski, supra note 86, at 201. 
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First, in short, Article 22 does establish an individual “right to an 
explanation” of an algorithmic decision.317 The text requires companies that 
deploy “solely” automated decision-making to adopt “suitable measures” to 
safeguard the rights of individuals.318 Recital 71 explains that these measures 
include a right “to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such 
assessment.”319 The apparent discrepancy between text and Recital spurred 
heated debate.320 The Guidelines on algorithmic decision-making appear, 
however, to resolve this.321 The Guidelines reason that the Recital’s right to 
explanation of an individual decision stems from an individual’s right to 
contest a decision or express that individual’s view, both of which are 
established in the GDPR’s text.322 
Article 22 establishes not just a right to an explanation but an 
opportunity to be heard. The GDPR requires that companies that use “solely” 
automated decision-making institute (1) a right to obtain human 
intervention, (2) a way to express one’s point of view, and (3) a way to 
contest a decision.323 This is a version of algorithmic due process, combining 
notice with several forms of an opportunity to be heard. 
How this will work in practice is an open question. The Article 22 rights 
around contestation appear, thus far, to be fairly weak. The GDPR does not 
provide for a neutral arbiter.324 Applicable Guidelines suggest the right to 
contest may be an internal company process.325 There are no guidelines as to 
what this process must entail. This raises the question of whether a company 
 
 317. Id. at 204. 
 318. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at art. 22, at 46. 
 319. Id. at 14. 
 320. See generally supra note 257.  
 321. Kaminski, supra note 86, at 204 (citing Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, 
supra note 265, at 27) 
 322. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 27 (“The data 
subject will only be able to challenge a decision or express their view if they fully understand how it has 
been made and on what basis.”). 
 323. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(3), at 46. Note that these requirements 
may or may not apply to member state law exception. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-
Making, supra note 265, at 23–24. 
 324. Compare Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32 (“[A 
suggested human intervention mechanism is] for example providing a link to an appeals process at the 
point the automated decision is delivered to the data subject, with agreed timescales for the review and a 
named contact point for any queries.”), with Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 127 (calling for a 
neutral arbiter). 
 325. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32. This seems to 
resemble some features of copyright’s notice-and-takedown process in the United States. See Margot E. 
Kaminski & Jennifer Urban, The Right to Contestation 24−25 (Aug. 14, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018) (establishing “limitations on liability related 
to material online”). 
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whose interests do not always align with its users’ will be capable of 
providing adequate process and fair results.326 There is room for substantially 
more policy development in fleshing out this contestation right.327 
The GDPR also requires the right to “obtain human intervention” in an 
algorithmic decision.328 There is no explanation of what this means nor how 
it is related to the rights to contest or to express an opinion. While the 
applicable Guidelines discuss the extent of human involvement necessary for 
decision-making to fall outside of Article 22,329 they do not discuss what 
level of human involvement constitutes “human intervention” to satisfy 
Article 22. As Danielle Citron has pointed out, due to “automation bias,” 
human intervention by itself may be inadequate for addressing concerns 
about algorithmic decision-making.330 Humans are inclined to accept what 
algorithms tell them as true unless they are trained otherwise. And it is 
unclear whether human intervention will, in fact, serve the goals of 
algorithmic due process. There may be dignitary benefits to putting a human 
on the loop, but there are also potential costs and dangers, including a 
possible increase in systemic bias. Additionally, with a human in the loop, 
blame can be misdirected at the intervening human rather than properly 
directed at overall system design.331 
Article 22, like its predecessor in the Data Protection Directive, 
contains significant potential loopholes.332 Article 22 applies only to solely 
 
 326. This is similar to the conversation in the United States about collateral censorship. Felix T. 
Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 298–
304 (2011). And the conversation in the EU about the right to be forgotten. See ANGELOPOULOS ET AL., 
supra note 252. 
 327. See Kaminski & Urban, supra note 326. 
 328. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(3), at 46. For discussions of the human in 
the loop, see infra note 331. 
 329. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 21 (discussing 
meaningful human involvement). 
 330. Citron, supra note 14, at 1271–72 (describing automation bias). 
 331. There are potential dangers to trying to solve the problems of automation by reinserting a 
human in or on the loop. Requiring a system to be built for human intervention or even for human 
oversight can affect its design, in ways that negatively impact other values, such as accuracy or even bias 
correction. See Zarsky, supra note 40. Putting a human in or on the loop can result in moral—or legal—
blame being directed at that human, rather than focusing enforcement efforts more effectively on overall 
system design. Madeleine Clare Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot, 5 
ENGAGING SCI., TECH., & SOC’Y 40, 42 (2019). Meg Jones has argued that moving a human in or out of 
the loop can be “both ineffective . . . and dangerous.” Jones, supra note 85, at 134. She calls instead for 
general automation design principles. Id. at 82–83. The GDPR’s insertion of a human into the loop of 
automated decision-making is a significant policy move that should prompt far more discussion than it 
has. 
 332. Bygrave, supra note 14, at 21–22. 
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automated decision-making.333 It requires the decision to have legal effects 
or similarly significant effects.334 Trade secret exceptions apply both to the 
right to explanation and to the related notification and access rights 
(disclosure of “meaningful information about the logic involved”), discussed 
above.335 However, the Guidelines have weighed in on the scope and 
strength of Article 22 and largely interpreted it to close or limit many of these 
loopholes.336 Thus the GDPR establishes a version of algorithmic due 
process oriented towards individuals and creates both notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 
C.  COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE 
The GDPR, however, does not limit its governance of algorithmic 
decision-making to individual rights. The GDPR also uses collaborative 
governance. 
The collaborative governance side of the GDPR has been overlooked, 
particularly in the context of algorithmic decision-making. To the extent that 
the literature on algorithmic accountability and the GDPR has looked past 
individual rights, its focus has been on particular requirements companies 
must meet, such as third-party audits and data protection impact 
assessments,337 rather than on the fact that the GDPR as a whole uses 
collaborative governance to address algorithmic decision-making.338 
 
 333. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(1), at 46; Edwards & Veale, supra note 
15, at 45; see also Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 14, at 83; Selbst & Powles, supra note 257, at 234–
35; Wachter et al., supra note 257, at 88. 
 334. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(1), at 46; see also Mendoza & Bygrave, 
supra note 14, at 83 (quoting Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22, at 46); Edwards & 
Veale, supra note 15, at 46; Selbst & Powles, supra note 257, at 234–35; Wachter et al., supra note 257, 
at 88 n.66. 
 335. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 13−15, at 40–43; see also id. at 12 (providing 
in Recital 63 that the right of access “should not adversely affect the rights or freedoms of others, 
including trade secrets or intellectual property”); Wachter et al., supra note 257, at 79 n.13, 84, 89; supra 
Section III.B.1. But see Brkan, supra note 257, (manuscript at 21–23) (citing Council Directive 2016/943, 
art. 5(d), 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1, 11 (EU)) (calling trade secrets and other IP concerns a “paper tiger”, and 
noting that EU law “provides for an exception that allows for suspension of a trade secret ‘for the purpose 
of protecting a legitimate interest recognized by Union or national law’” (citation omitted)). 
 336. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 19–28. 
 337. Casey et al., supra note 257, at 170–84; Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 78 (“[T]he new 
Article 35 is compulsory . . . and its definitions of ‘high risk’ technologies are almost certain to capture 
many if not most ML systems.”). 
 338. One source evaluates the GDPR’s impact assessment requirement through the lens of 
regulatory theory, identifying it as “meta-regulation,” a subcategory of collaborative governance. Reuben 
Binns, Data Protection Impact Assessments: A Meta-regulatory Approach, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 22, 
29–30 (2017). 
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Focusing on these individual requirements misses the forest for the 
trees. Characterizing the GDPR as a system of collaborative governance 
changes the conversation about accountability and transparency from a 
discussion of individual tools to a system-wide evaluation that reveals both 
strengths and weaknesses in the GDPR’s design, including in how its system 
of collaborative governance interacts with its individual rights. 
The GDPR contains not just individual rights but duties imposed on 
companies. These duties are often voiced in broad terms that will be given 
meaning and effect over time through a variety of collaborative governance 
mechanisms—both formal, such as codes of conduct, and informal, such as 
standards coupled with guidance coupled with interpretation by internal 
company data protection officers (“DPOs”) in conversation with 
regulators.339 
I break down the toolkit of the GDPR into such formal and informal 
collaborative modes below.340 The formally coregulatory aspects of the 
GDPR might never be realized; codes of conduct have, thus far, rarely been 
used in the EU.341 I argue that the informally collaborative nature of the 
GDPR is both more overlooked and more practically relevant. First, 
however, I begin with an overall assessment of the GDPR as a collaborative 
governance regime. 
1.  The GDPR as Collaborative Governance 
Rather than asking whether individual or institutional accountability is 
more effective, we should be asking whether the GDPR works as 
collaborative governance. Does it contain the right balance between hard and 
soft law—between command-and-control mechanisms and responsive 
regulation?342 Does it effectively delegate to the private sector while 
bounding the level of deregulation a private company can achieve? Does it 
create a deep enough system of structured accountability to make its 
governance legitimate, both in the sense of eventually producing good 
 
 339. This feature of regulatory design is likely deliberate. See First Report on the Implementation 
of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), supra note 258, at 26. 
 340. See infra Sections III.C.2–.3.  
 341. See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving Global Privacy Rules 
Through Sector-Based Codes of Conduct, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1029, 1057 (2013); McGeveran, supra note 
136, at 961 n.2 (noting codes of conduct are rarely used in Ireland). The European Commission noted as 
early as 2003 its frustration with the failure of codes of conduct. First Report on the Implementation of 
the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), supra note 258, at 26 (“The Commission is disappointed that 
so few organisations have come forward with sectoral Codes of Conduct . . . .”). 
 342. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 101–33; see also McGeveran, supra note 136, 
at 979–82. 
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substantive law and in the sense of appearing legitimate as a system? 
The GDPR is, along certain dimensions, fundamentally a hard law 
regime. Law can be harder or softer along a spectrum that runs across 
multiple dimensions: how precise a rule is versus how vague; how obligatory 
a rule is versus how optional or advisory; and what enforcement mechanisms 
exist.343 While the GDPR contains a number of what I would argue are 
deliberately vague rules, it is for the most part hard law: an obligatory 
regime, coupled with strong enforcement powers. A GDPR violation can 
famously trigger administrative fines of up to 4 percent of worldwide 
revenue.344 The GDPR consolidates and further empowers an extensive 
national and transnational system of government regulators.345 It creates 
broader enforcement powers for individuals—for example, allowing 
individuals to authorize nonprofits to lodge complaints on their behalf.346 
And the GDPR is backed by an increasingly involved court, the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”), which has in recent years repeatedly ruled in favor 
of data protection rights.347 In other words, the GDPR has potentially very 
serious teeth. There are, thus, real incentives for companies to participate in 
collaborative efforts to flesh out broader rules and to voluntarily comply with 
the outcomes of those efforts to avoid government sanctions. 
The GDPR is also hardish law when it comes to its formal requirements, 
even where its substance is vague on its face. The vagueness of the GDPR is 
still highly bounded.348 For example, the text of Article 22 does not 
conclusively define what “suitable measures” are,349 but between the text, 
 
 343. See, for example, the three dimensions of hard and soft law defined by Kenneth Abbott and 
others, Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000); see also 
Gunther F. Handl et al., A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 371, 374–75 (1988) 
(discussing the dimensions of content, signals of authority, and communications of intent to make the law 
effective); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and 
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 552 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., Sage 
Publ’ns 2002) (considering  “the form of the agreement; the substance of the agreement . . . ; and the 
structure for review of performance”); 
 344. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 83(5), at 83. 
 345. Id. art. arts 51–59, at 65–70. 
 346. Id. art. 80, at 81. 
 347. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May 13, 
2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN; Joined 
Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ir. Ltd v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine and Nat. Res. (Apr. 
8, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=150642&doclang=EN; see also 
European Court of Human Rights, Zakharov v. Russia, App. No. 47143/06 (Dec. 4, 2015), http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159324. While the GDPR will primarily be interpreted by the ECJ, 
European Court of Human Rights case law forms a backstop of human rights protection in the EU. 
 348. See Kaminski, supra note 152, at 946 (discussing bounded versus unbounded uncertainty in 
collaborative governance). 
 349. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22, at 46. 
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the Recitals, and the Guidelines, the GDPR qua regime provides a slew of 
specific requirements, examples, and outer limits. 
This is true of nearly every GDPR requirement. On the face of the text, 
the GDPR is vague; coupled with its interpretative documents or earlier law 
and practices arising out of the predecessor Data Protection Directive, there 
is only so much room for companies to maneuver. On the one hand, this 
potentially constricts collaborative governance, limiting the types of 
solutions the private sector might offer or discouraging the private sector 
from collaborating when it cannot change the rules. On the other hand, it 
bounds private-sector lawmaking and creates a substantive backstop to 
private-sector negotiations, in the name of protecting fundamental rights. 
How the softer and harder aspects of the GDPR play out and interact in 
practice will do a great deal to determine whether its attempts at collaborative 
governance are effective. Authorities will need to show enough strength to 
incentivize companies to meaningfully participate but enough gentleness to 
discourage adversarial posturing.350 The GDPR risks being too hard in some 
places and too soft in others, effectively encouraging companies to route 
around harder law to seek out less regulated spaces.351 
There is potential for similar arbitrage with respect to member state 
variations. While the GDPR purports to harmonize EU data protection law, 
it contains a number of opportunities for member states to vary their legal 
systems, including in governing algorithmic accountability.352 There are 
both costs and benefits to state-by-state variation. The potential benefit is 
that variation could allow for policy experimentation, as federalism does in 
the United States. But state-by-state variation can also increase compliance 
costs and incentivize companies to target their resources at lobbying 
individual Member State legislatures, rather than collaborating with data 
 
 350. It is possible that regulators’ opening gambits in negotiations with private companies are too 
weak/conciliatory already, in an effort not to be seen as business killing. See, e.g., Lobel, The Renew 
Deal, supra note 7, at 451 (discussing “positive slippage,” with standards as opening salvo). 
 351. For example, Facebook’s counsel discussed avoiding using consent for compliance and instead 
taking the less onerous business interests route. Caroline Spiezio, In-House Leaders from Facebook, Uber 
and Others Discuss the Complexity of Consent in GDPR, LAW.COM: CORPORATE COUNSEL (Apr. 20, 
2018, 3:16 PM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/04/20/in-house-leaders-from-facebook-uber-
and-others-discuss-the-complexity-of-consent-in-gdpr/?slreturn=20180326083826. 
 352. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(2)(b), at 46 (discussing that a person’s 
right not to be subject to solely automated decisions does not apply when the decision “is authorised by 
Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which also lays down suitable measures 
to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests”); see also Gianclaudio 
Malgieri, Automated Decisionmaking in the EU Member States: The Right to Explanation and Other 
“Suitable Measures” in the National Legislations, COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV., July 19, 2019, at 1, 
5–18.  
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protection authorities. From a managerial perspective, too, a more 
harmonized regime can result in stronger centralized compliance culture in 
a company, while a less harmonized regime may lead to a more fractured, 
less effective internal compliance structure. 
The GDPR heavily relies on government regulators—perhaps too 
heavily, for a purportedly collaborative regime. Data protection authorities 
and the European Data Protection Board are envisioned as active, 
independent regulators, responsible for a wide variety of tasks.353 If the 
GDPR’s regulators are too command-and-control minded, they may override 
the collaborative nature of the system and eliminate envisioned benefits from 
private sector involvement. If, on the other hand, they are not strong or 
involved enough, then the GDPR has numerous potential weaknesses that 
companies can exploit to effectively deregulate. In practice, in the recent 
past, data protection authorities have faced limited resources.354 
While the GDPR heavily relies on traditional government regulators, it 
minimally invokes participation by third parties. This is perhaps the weakest 
point in the entire system, and one I discuss at greater length below.355 The 
GDPR for the most part envisions collaboration as taking place between 
regulators and regulated private parties, to the exclusion of third parties, such 
as civil society or external experts. This threatens both the substance and 
legitimacy of the regime. To some extent, this design flaw may reflect the 
relative weakness of civil society in the EU. 
Before I return to this central problem of structured accountability, 
however, I outline the details of the GDPR as a collaborative system. The 
GDPR consists of both formal and informal collaborative mechanisms that 
together create the outlines of an extensive collaborative governance regime. 
2.  Formal Coregulation 
The GDPR contains a number of formal mechanisms for policy 
collaboration between companies and regulators, including codes of conduct 
 
 353. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 22, art. 52, at 66, art. 69, at 76.  
 354. See, e.g., J. TREVOR HUGHES, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS, DATA PROTECTION 
AUTHORITIES 10 (2011), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/knowledge_center/DPA11_Survey_final.pdf (stating 
the average European budget is under €5 million); see also DAVID BARNARD-WILLIS & DAVID WRIGHT, 
TRILATERAL RESEARCH & CONSULTING, U.K., CO-ORDINATION AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN DATA 
PROTECTION AUTHORITIES 9, 143 (2014), http://www.phaedra-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/PHAED 
RA-D1-30-Dec-2014.pdf (“The consortium recognises that many [data protection authorities] face 
constraints, by way of human and/or budgetary shortages, institutional and legislative rules and other 
factors.”)  (citing limited budget or human resources as constraining cooperation). 
 355. See infra Section III.C.4.  
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and certification.356 Both of these formal coregulatory mechanisms are cited 
in the Guidelines on algorithmic decision-making.357 And even though the 
incorporation of technical standards is not yet explicitly part of the GDPR’s 
approach to algorithmic decision-making, I discuss it briefly here.358 
First, the GDPR might formally coregulate algorithmic decision-
making through codes of conduct.359 Industry groups are encouraged to 
prepare codes of conduct to clarify the application of the GDPR in sector-
specific or even technology-specific areas.360 Codes of conduct act as safe 
harbors from the GDPR: once a code has been approved by the relevant 
government authority, a company that follows it can be assured it will not be 
held liable.361 Some codes may even be eventually implemented as EU-wide 
law.362 Thus companies could come together to create a code of conduct for 
auditing machine-learning algorithms363 or a code of conduct outlining other 
suitable measures to be applied to prevent algorithmic bias or discrimination 
or privacy violations. 
Certification is a softer coregulatory mechanism.364 It does not create a 
safe harbor from GDPR enforcement365 but instead seeks to use market 
measures to incentivize industry participation. It works as follows: groups of 
companies would create certification standards and consumers would seek 
out those companies that are certified, like purchasers who search for goods 
or companies certified by the Better Business Bureau or Certified 
Humane.366 While it does not create a safe harbor, certification potentially 
reduces enforcement risks for companies. Supervisory authorities or the 
 
 356. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, arts. 40–42, at 56–59. 
 357. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 30. 
 358. Id. at 32 (referring to “agreed standards,” but leaving unclear whether this refers formally to 
technical standards). 
 359. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, arts. 40–41, at 56–58. 
 360. Id. art. 40(2), at 56–57. 
 361. Id. art. 40(5), at 57 (“The supervisory authority shall provide an opinion on whether the draft 
code, amendment or extension complies with this Regulation and shall approve that draft code, 
amendment or extension if it finds that it provides sufficient appropriate safeguards.”) (describing how 
the Board shall issue an opinion if the activity applies in more than one Member State). 
 362. Id. art. 40(9), at 57 (“The Commission may, by way of implementing acts, decide that the 
approved code of conduct, amendment or extension submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 8 of this Article 
have general validity within the Union.”). 
 363. See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32. 
 364. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 42, at 58–59. 
 365. Id. art. 42(4), at 59 (“A certification pursuant to [Article 42] does not reduce the responsibility 
of the controller or the processor for compliance with this Regulation and is without prejudice to the tasks 
and powers of the supervisory authorities . . . .”). 
 366. Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a “Right to an Explanation” 
to a “Right to Better Decisions”?, 16 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, May-June 2018, at 46, 52 (“There is 
also little proof users regard seals and certificates as indicators of trust . . . .”). 
  
2019] BINARY GOVERNANCE 1601 
Board are involved in the creation of certification criteria.367 Since those 
same authorities are responsible for GDPR enforcement, they are unlikely to 
pursue a company that is compliant with certification standards. 
A third formal coregulatory mechanism involves the development of 
technical standards and the incorporation of them by reference into the 
regulation.368 There is in fact a formal process in the EU whereby the 
European Commission can issue a request to the European Standardization 
Organizations to establish “an agreed way of meeting legal requirements,” 
through technical standards.369 There is evidence that this process will be 
used for a number of GDPR requirements.370 Several articles of the GDPR 
explicitly reference technical standards,371 and other provisions leave space 
for the process.372 
With respect to algorithmic decision-making, there are several possible 
hooks for the incorporation of technical standards. The Guidance on 
algorithmic decision-making references the use of “agreed standards,”373 and 
the Recital language on profiling suggests that companies use “technical and 
organisational measures” to prevent inaccuracies and error.374 
3.  Informal Collaborative Governance 
In addition to these formal coregulatory mechanisms, the GDPR 
contains a number of informal tools that appear to be central to its system of 
governing algorithmic decision-making. These include broad legal standards 
 
 367. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 42(5), at 59. 
 368. Kamara, supra note 259, at 15; see also Bremer, supra note 164, at 147–50. 
 369. Kamara, supra note 259, at 7 (citation omitted).  
 370. Id. at 14 (discussing standards on “how to address and manage privacy and personal data 
protection issues during the design and development and the production and service provision processes 
of security technologies” and standards that “specify[] the privacy and personal data protection 
management processes with an explanation how [sic] to realise them”). In 2015 the European 
Commission issued a request for the development of standards addressing privacy by design under the 
Data Protection Directive; this process is ongoing. 
 371. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 21(5), at 46 (“[T]he data subject may exercise 
his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications.”) (discussing the right to 
object and certification); id. art. 43(9), at 60 (“The Commission may adopt implementing acts laying 
down technical standards for certification mechanisms . . . .”). 
 372. Kamara, supra note 259, at 8 (“[S]everal provisions of the GDPR could be the basis for 
development of technical standards in the field. One prominent example is the provisions that establish 
technology design obligations, such data protection [sic] by design and by default . . . .”).  
 373. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32 (discussing 
“agreed standards”). 
 374. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 14 (“[T]he controller should use appropriate 
mathematical or statistical procedures for the profiling [and] implement technical and organisational 
measures appropriate to ensure, in particular, that factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data are 
corrected and the risk of errors is minimized . . . .”).  
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interpreted over time through softer regulatory guidance and private sector 
efforts; management reform, such as the requirement that companies appoint 
Data Protection Officers (“DPOs”) and abide by reporting requirements; and 
requirements of third-party oversight, such as audits or expert boards. 
In its governance of algorithmic decision-making, as elsewhere,375 the 
GDPR uses broad legal standards to articulate company duties and fills them 
in through collaborative mechanisms. One such standard is Article 22’s 
“suitable measures” requirement. Article 22 tasks companies that conduct 
algorithmic decision-making with implementing “suitable measures to 
safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate 
interests . . . .”376 This is a broad, technology-neutral standard.377 The GDPR 
itself does not indicate how a company operating in a specific sector or using 
a specific technology might comply. The text of the GDPR provides some 
specific requirements, discussed above. But this list is not exhaustive, as the 
debate over the right to explanation makes clear.  
The Guidelines, as part of the collaborative governance ecosystem, 
begin to fill out what this broad legal standard will look like in practice. Over 
time, enforcement by data protection authorities or even court decisions may 
create more specific standards or even specific rules. Until then, “suitable 
measures” will largely be constituted in part by hard law, in part by guidance, 
and in part by internal company practices. 
The GDPR’s principle of “fairness” is another example. The GDPR 
establishes the broad principle of “fairness” in its hard-law text. 
Accompanying softer law documents interpret the broad requirement of 
“fairness” to include at least accuracy and non-discrimination; this 
interpretation applies to algorithmic decision-making.378 The Guidelines 
several times refer to fairness, non-discrimination, and accuracy in the same 
breath.379 
 
 375. See e.g., Lee, supra note 259, 1027–29. 
 376. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(3), at 46. 
 377. Kamara, supra note 259. at 10–11 (discussing “technology neutrality”). 
 378. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 14, art. 5(1)(a), at 35 (“In order to ensure fair 
and transparent processing . . . , [companies must] ensure . . . that factors which result in inaccuracies in 
personal data are corrected and the risk of errors is [sic] minimized . . . .”) (discussing the application of 
principles of lawfulness, fairness, and transparency to personal data processing). To meet the GDPR’s 
broad requirement of fairness, companies must “prevent[] . . . discriminatory effects on natural persons 
on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, 
genetic or health status or sexual orientation . . . .” Id. at 14. The GDPR Guidelines echo this 
interpretation. The Guidelines refer to inaccuracy, discrimination, and the perpetuation of existing 
stereotypes as harms caused by algorithmic decision-making. See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, 
Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 5–6. 
 379. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 14 (discussing 
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These softer law documents explicitly turn to the private sector to 
determine how these goals will be met in practice. Recital 71 calls for 
algorithmic error and discrimination to be addressed through “appropriate 
mathematical or statistical procedures” and the implementation of “technical 
and organisational measures,” the precise nature of which will be determined 
by the private sector or perhaps through technical standards setting, 
discussed above.380 The Guidelines call for companies to address these goals 
through a robust combination of management reform,381 technical measures 
that include regular testing,382 third-party auditing,383 and expert review 
boards.384 
Thus the broad standards established in the GDPR’s text feed into an 
elaborate system of collaborate governance. As part of this system, the 
GDPR repeatedly attempts to institute internal management reform. It 
requires, for example, certain companies to hire an internal but independent 
DPO385 tasked with monitoring compliance with the GDPR.386 Most 
companies using algorithmic decision-making will be subject to this 
requirement.387 
The GDPR additionally attempts to influence management reform 
through recording requirements, impact assessments for some kinds of 
processing (including most algorithmic decision-making), and the 
suggestion that companies perform regular quality checks and internal 
auditing. The GDPR generally requires companies (with some exceptions 
 
“safeguards aimed at ensuring fairness, non-discrimination and accuracy in the profiling process”). See 
also id. at 16 (“Controllers should introduce appropriate procedures and measures to prevent errors, 
inaccuracies or discrimination on the basis of special category data.” (footnote omitted)). 
 380. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 14. 
 381. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 29–31 (discussing 
data protection impact assessments (“DPIAs”)). 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. at 30. 
 384. Id.  
 385. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 38, at 55–56. 
 386. Id. art. 39(1)(b), at 56. 
 387. Companies who use algorithmic decision-making include those companies whose core 
activities involve processing especially sensitive personal data (such as racial or ethnic origin, biometric 
data, and health data) and those companies whose business model involves systemic large-scale 
monitoring. See id. art. 9, at 38–39, art. 37(1)(b)–(c), at 55. The DPO is described as being “a person with 
expert knowledge of data protection law and practices . . . .” Id. at 18. And the DPO is responsible for 
training staff about their GDPR responsibilities. Id. art. 39(1)(b), at 56. 
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for small companies)388 to keep records of data processing.389 These reports 
are not necessarily geared towards creating detailed external oversight, 
though they are accessible to regulators upon inspection.390 Recording 
requirements may by themselves instigate reform within a company, as 
technical experts are required to assess and describe their systems for these 
records.391  
In addition to keeping records for outside inspection, most companies 
deploying algorithmic decision-making will have to create impact 
assessments.392 Impact assessments are mandatory under the GDPR in some 
circumstances, including in algorithmic decision-making.393 The Guidelines 
envision impact assessments as an iterative, ongoing process that includes 
documentation, monitoring, and review.394 This is largely an internal 
 
 388. Id, art. 30(5), at 51. Article 30 explains that certain record keeping obligations  
shall not apply to an enterprise or an organisation employing fewer than 250 persons unless 
the processing it carries out is likely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects, the processing is not occasional, or the processing includes special categories of data 
as referred to in Article 9(1) or personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences 
referred to in Article 10. 
Id. 
 389. Id. art. 30, at 50–51. These records must include the purposes of processing, a description of 
the categories of individuals and data, and a description of where the data goes, among other things. Id. 
 390. These records might not be detailed; for example, cybersecurity records need only give “a 
general description” of measures employed. Id. art. 30(1)(g), at 51. 
 391. See also Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1129 (suggesting recording 
requirements as reform). 
 392. Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 77–80. 
 393. The GDPR mandates internal impact assessments when a company engages in “high risk” 
processing, which includes personal evaluations “based on automated processing” and with significant 
effects. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 35, at 53–54 (stating that a DPIA is required 
only if processing is “likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons”). The 
Working Party Guidelines read this as including the solely automated processing covered by Article 22, 
in addition to algorithms that involve more substantial human oversight. Article 29 Data Prot. Working 
Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 29–31. Impact assessments are also required when there is 
“systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale.” Council Regulation 2016/679, 
supra note 13, art. 35(3)(c), at 53. This could reach a good amount of sensor processing (say processing 
information gathered by smart cars or drones) regardless of whether it involves a decision with significant 
effects on a person or is solely automated. Id. at 18–19, art. 35(3)(a), at 53.  In fact, Recital 91 provides 
the following:  
A data protection impact assessment should also be made where personal data are processed 
for taking decisions regarding specific natural persons following any systematic and extensive 
evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons based on profiling those data or 
following the processing of special categories of personal data, biometric data, or data on 
criminal convictions and offences or related security measures. 
Id. at 18–19. 
 394. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 29-30; Article 29 
Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and Determining 
Whether Processing Is “Likely to Result in a High Risk” for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP248 
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process. Only “high risk” assessments require consultation with the 
government.395 For the rest, if a company has a DPO, the impact assessment 
must involve the DPO.396 While this is not equivalent to direct government 
involvement, it may put in place both internal oversight and internal 
compliance efforts. 
For high-risk activity, the GDPR’s impact assessment process could be 
characterized as a soft version of premarket approval: requiring a company 
to be in conversation with the government and to adjust its risk-management 
process before releasing automated decision-making on the public.397 Even 
for non-high-risk impact assessments, the government still plays a role in 
ensuring accountability because impact assessments are subject to retention 
and updating requirements and potentially to government disclosure.398 
Impact assessments may play a potential role in rule setting, as well. 
They do not create an industry-wide standard. Over time, however, impact 
assessments may end up affecting general compliance standards, as the 
government repeatedly assesses individual use cases.399 
 
rev.01, at 16 (Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, DPIA] (providing a chart 
of impact assessment processes). 
 395. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 36, at 54–55 (“The controller shall consult 
the supervisory authority prior to processing where a data protection impact assessment under Article 35 
indicates that the processing would result in a high risk in the absence of measures taken by the controller 
to mitigate the risk.”). Unfortunately the guidelines give little explanation of what activity will require 
prior government consultation. Instead, the Guidelines provide the following:  
It is in cases where the identified risks cannot be sufficiently addressed by the data controller 
(i.e. the residual risks remains high) then the data controller must consult the supervisory 
authority. An example of an unacceptable high residual risk includes instances where the data 
subjects may encounter significant, or even irreversible, consequences, which they may not 
overcome . . . and/or when it seems obvious that the risk will occur . . . . Whenever the data 
controller cannot find sufficient measures . . . (i.e. the residual risks are still high), consultation 
with the supervisory authority is required.  
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, DPIA, supra note 394, at 18–19 (footnote omitted); see also Council 
Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 18. 
 396. Companies whose core activities involve processing especially sensitive personal data (such 
as racial or ethnic origin data, biometric data, and health data) or which “by virtue of their nature, their 
scope and/or their purposes, require regular and systematic monitoring of [individuals] on a large scale” 
must appoint a DPO. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 9, at 38–39, art. 37(1)(b)–(c), 
at 55. If a company has a DPO, then it must consult with that officer when it conducts impact assessments. 
Id. art. 35(2), at 53. 
 397. Price, supra note 8, at 43, at 449–51 (describing the FDA Class III premarket approval for 
medical devices); Tutt, supra note 14, at 111 (calling for premarket approval of algorithms). 
 398. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 36(3)(e), at 54–55; Article 29 Data Prot. 
Working Party, DPIA, supra note 394, at 18 (“[R]egardless of whether or not consultation with the 
supervisory is required based on the level of residual risk then the obligations of retaining a record of the 
DPIA and updating the DPIA in due course remain.”).  
 399. Antoni Roig, Safeguards for the Right Not To Be Subject to a Decision Based Solely on 
Automated Processing (Article 22 GDPR), 8 EUR. J.L. & TECH., no. 3, 2017, at 1, 2 (describing DPIAs 
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Beyond appointing a DPO, meeting reporting requirements, and 
conducting impact assessments, the Guidelines suggest a wealth of 
additional internal company practices geared at instrumental goals. The 
Guidelines caution that as part of “suitable measures” to protect individuals’ 
rights, companies should perform “regular quality assurance checks of their 
systems to make sure that individuals are being treated fairly and not 
discriminated against . . . .”400 Companies should also perform “algorithmic 
auditing,” regularly testing algorithms to ensure they are “not producing 
discriminatory, erroneous or unjustified results . . . .”401 
Finally, at least in the context of algorithmic decision-making, the 
GDPR’s softer law guidance envisions substantial third-party oversight. It is 
possible to interpret Recital 71 to require auditing.402 The Guidelines more 
explicitly suggest deploying third-party audits and establishing ethical 
review boards.403 These suggested accountability requirements, although not 
in the GDPR text itself, are likely to have a significant practical impact on 
the industry as it searches for guidance on how to comply with the GDPR.404 
The GDPR’s collaborative governance regime is aimed not just at 
protecting privacy or ensuring accountability but at what should now be 
familiar instrumental goals of preventing error, bias, and discrimination in 
algorithmic decision-making.405 The GDPR’s required “safeguards” that 
must be applied to automated decision-making are not just individual due 
process rights but an iterative system of management reform and third-party 
oversight.406 Thus the text of the GDPR—both its formal coregulatory 
 
as “data generator[] for policy purposes”). 
 400. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32. 
 401. Id.  
 402. Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 250, at 258 (“[W]e argue that Articles 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) and 
15(1)(h) state a duty to perform an auditing of decision-making algorithms . . . .”). 
 403. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32 (suggesting 
audits “where decision-making based on profiling has a high impact on individuals”). For third-party 
auditing, the Working Group envisions a deeper form of transparency, explaining that it will be good 
practice to “provide the auditor with all necessary information about how the algorithm or machine 
learning system works . . . .” Id. The Working Party additionally envisions harnessing companies 
themselves as oversight, suggesting that companies contractually require third parties to conduct auditing 
and testing and ensure compliance with “agreed standards.” Id. 
 404. Casey et al., supra note 257, at 171–74. 
 405. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 6 (“The GDPR 
introduces new provisions to address the risks arising from profiling and automated decision-making, 
notably, but not limited to, privacy.”); id. at 10 (“Profiling may be unfair and create discrimination . . 
. .”); id. at 14 (referring to “the safeguards aimed at ensuring fairness, non-discrimination and accuracy 
in the profiling process”). 
 406. Id. at 28 (“Controllers should introduce appropriate . . . measures to prevent errors, 
inaccuracies or discrimination on the basis of special category data. These measures should be used on a 
cyclical basis; not only at the design stage, but also continuously . . . . The outcome of such testing should 
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provisions and its less formal collaborative mechanisms—combined with the 
context of interpretative guidance together establishes a binary approach to 
regulating algorithmic decision-making under the GDPR. 
4.  The GDPR’s Accountability Problem 
It is important to understand the GDPR as a system of collaborative 
governance, because this reveals its potentially significant weakness. The 
GDPR, for all its coregulatory and collaborative measures, does not establish 
adequate public-facing or even expert-facing accountability. The lack of 
public transparency coupled with a lack of mechanisms for third-party 
involvement, both expert and stakeholder, threatens both the substantive 
output and procedural legitimacy of the GDPR as a collaborative governance 
regime. This Section points out the gaps in the GDPR’s system of structured 
accountability, starting with several of its formal coregulatory mechanisms 
and then turning to the example of impact assessments. 
The GDPR’s process for establishing codes of conduct does not require 
public transparency or the involvement of third parties. The GDPR primarily 
envisions a back-and-forth between companies and government 
authorities.407 (Recital 99 suggests that companies should consult 
stakeholders when drawing up codes of conduct but does not require it.)408 
Codes of conduct are to be published after they are completed.409 The GDPR 
then envisions using third parties to help monitor compliance,410 imagining 
that they will lodge complaints with a compliance body.411 But these third 
parties have no information-finding powers over companies. It is unclear 
how they will be meaningfully capable of identifying violations of codes of 
conduct if they have no way to see what companies are doing internally. 
The GDPR’s certification process similarly lacks public 
accountability.412 Again the process of creating certification standards does 
 
feed back into the system design.” (footnotes omitted)) (discussing a special category data). 
 407. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 40(5), (7)–(8), at 57 (describing the processes 
in individual Member States, involving the Board and Commission in the case of several Member States). 
 408. Id. at 19 (“[Drafters of a code of conduct should] have regard to submissions received and 
views expressed in response to such consultations.”). 
 409. Id. art. 40(6), at 57.  
 410. Id. art. 41(2)(c), at 58 (“[A compliance body must set up] established procedures and structures 
to handle complaints about infringements of the code or the manner in which the code has been, or is 
being, implemented by a controller or processor, and to make those procedures and structures transparent 
to data subjects and the public . . . .”). 
 411. Id. art. 41, at 58. 
 412. Recital 100 seems to characterize certification itself as a form of transparency, as shorthand 
for info data subjects can use “allowing data subjects to quickly assess the level of data protection of 
relevant products and services.” Id. at 19. 
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not appear open to the public or to third-party participation. Again, as with 
codes of conduct, the GDPR envisions that third parties will be able to 
complain about a lack of compliance with certification standards.413 But they 
are not involved in setting standards nor in ongoing monitoring or oversight. 
Impact assessments, too, only minimally involve third parties at the 
creation phase. Unlike with codes of conduct or certification, companies are 
required to consult with third parties in forming impact assessments. But this 
consultation is required only “[w]here appropriate” and with an eye to 
guarding commercial secrets.414 The Guidelines further explain that third-
party views can be sought in a variety of ways, including through studies or 
questionnaires or surveys, rather than giving third parties a seat at the 
table.415 These modes of consultation do not necessarily bring meaningful 
external oversight into the process of creating the substance of an impact 
assessment. 
The most striking gap in public and third-party accountability in the 
GDPR is its approach to releasing—or not releasing—algorithmic impact 
assessments. While the GDPR’s impact assessments have been heralded as 
a model for algorithmic accountability,416 the process does not in fact involve 
releasing information to the public. A company is merely encouraged, not 
required, to publicly release its impact assessments.417 Even where 
publication is encouraged, the Guidelines envision only partial release or 
release of a summary.418 This differs crucially from the model of impact 
assessments usually employed in collaborative governance literature.419 
Publicly disclosed impact assessments are used as a soft form of regulation 
 
 413. Id. art. 43(2)(d), at 60–61 (providing that to be accredited a certification body must “establish[] 
procedures and structures to handle complaints about infringements of the certification or the manner in 
which the certification has been, or is being, implemented by the controller or processor, and to make 
those procedures and structures transparent to data subjects and the public”). 
 414. Id. art. 35(9), at 54. 
 415. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, DPIA, supra note 394, at 15. A company should 
document its reasons for not seeking third-party views or for making a decision that diverges from the 
outcome of its surveys 
 416. AI Now Inst., supra note 198. 
 417. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, DPIA, supra note 394, at 18 (“Publishing a DPIA is not 
a legal requirement of the GDPR, it is the controller ś decision to do so. However, controllers should 
consider publishing at least parts, such as a summary or a conclusion of their DPIA.”). 
 418. Id. (“The published DPIA does not need to contain the whole assessment, especially when the 
DPIA could present specific information concerning security risks for the data controller or give away 
trade secrets or commercially sensitive information . . . [T]he published version could consist of just a 
summary of the DPIA’s main findings . . . .”). 
 419. Freeman, supra note 6, at 663 (“When publicly disclosed, the commitments in the FPA might 
serve, moreover, as the benchmark against which wholly independent third-party monitors could hold 
both the agency and the firm to account.”). 
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to trigger market mechanisms and other forms of third-party oversight and 
feedback. An impact assessment, in other words, is supposed to be a tripartite 
conversation between a regulated entity, the regulator, and third parties such 
as impacted persons or civil society organizations.420 In the GDPR, it is 
largely used internally or, at most, in conversation with regulators. 
It is possible that despite the GDPR’s lack of public transparency and 
input by third parties, impact assessments and maybe draft codes of conduct 
will be made available to the public through other means. Freedom of 
information law might be used to obtain public disclosure. These efforts will 
encounter various exceptions—not to the GDPR but to local freedom of 
information law—including for trade secrets. But by making the “how” of 
transparency in this space a pull mechanism (freedom of information law) 
rather than a push mechanism (required public release), the GDPR increases 
transparency’s costs and lowers the likelihood that it will be achieved. 
This, then, is the central question about the GDPR as a system of 
collaborative governance: Are the various forms of both government and 
third-party oversight outlined in the GDPR’s text, Recitals, and Guidelines 
adequate to ensure high-quality collaborative governance in the absence of 
true public transparency?421 
The answer will depend on a number of factors. It will depend on the 
government’s independence and resources—how effective, in practice, data 
protection authorities will be. It will depend on how government authorities 
enforce the GDPR, including how they interpret individual disclosure 
requirements and whether they receive adequate legal training to push back 
on overclaims of corporate secrecy. It will depend on the ability of NGOs 
and other policy advocates to harness the GDPR’s system of individual 
transparency rights coupled possibly with freedom of information laws to 
obtain both enforcement and transparency.422 To accomplish meaningful 
oversight, both NGOs and the press will need to link individual disclosures 
into politically effective group narratives, revealing what is going on over an 
algorithmic decision-making system as a whole. This will be costly and time-
consuming and will involve much coordination. Still, it may be possible over 
time. 
The GDPR’s effectiveness at collaborative governance will also depend 
 
 420. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12. 
 421. Thanks to Sarah Eskens for helping to formulate the question. 
 422. There is no class action mechanism in Europe, generally speaking, but the GDPR envisions 
forms of third-party representation that could do some of this work. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra 
note 13, art. 80, at 81. 
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on companies themselves. As industries come together to determine codes 
of conduct and certification criteria and relatedly the content of appropriate 
technological design, will they (voluntarily) engage external stakeholders, 
including members of impacted communities? Will they use these systems 
to try to constrain rogue bad actors within industry?423 
Perhaps the GDPR’s extensive individual transparency rights could go 
some way to providing access to third parties. Although the GDPR contains 
significant subject access rights,424 it is not a general-purpose freedom of 
information law. The GDPR’s transparency measures are derived from the 
FIPs and oriented towards individuals, not the public. But because the GDPR 
relies on collaborative governance, its attempts at individual transparency 
must serve a dual role. Absent policy changes, the GDPR’s individual 
transparency provisions will need to serve both individual dignitary and 
justificatory ends and as a crucial element of structured accountability in its 
collaborative governance regime. It is not clear that, as currently interpreted 
to provide information useful to individuals but not to experts, they will be 
capable of this dual function. 
There thus remain significant gaps in the structured accountability of 
the GDPR regime. Individual disclosure of an individually explanatory 
nature will likely fail to trigger market mechanisms or drive new policy 
efforts. It will also likely fail to incorporate external expertise, because 
information of an explanatory nature cannot be effectively evaluated by 
outside experts with a view to auditing a system. The GDPR’s third-party 
audit mechanisms or expert boards (which are Guideline suggestions, not 
GDPR text) conversely allow for expert oversight but envision no way for 
the public to be alerted by regulators to problems with a particular 
algorithmic system once experts identify it. These gaps in the GDPR’s 
system of structured accountability mean that the rules governing 
companies, implementation of these rules, and compliance with them will 
lack public and third-party involvement and oversight. This will hamper both 
expert input into the system and the substantive and procedural legitimacy 
of the regime. 
 
 423. See Thaw, supra note 152, at 371–74 (noting it can be in the self-interest of an industry to 
monitor risk across an industry as a whole to prevent political backlash when bad things happen because 
of the behavior of a rogue company). 
 424. Jef Ausloos & Pierre Dewitte, Shattering One-Way Mirrors—Data Subject Access Rights in 
Practice, 8 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 4, 28 (2019) (reviewing subject access rights in practice and arguing 
for their importance in providing checks and balances both individually and collectively). 
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D.  INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO PRONGS 
This brings us to potential interactions between the two prongs of binary 
governance in the GDPR. The GDPR, as discussed, is primarily hard law 
and is strongly individual rights-oriented. At the same time, the GDPR’s 
collaborative face will play a significant role in constituting individual rights 
and relatedly determining what duties companies owe. Depending on how 
the GDPR is implemented in practice, these two prongs can strengthen or 
weaken each other and may in places inevitably conflict. 
1.  Where the Two Prongs Are Complementary 
The GDPR’s nature as hard law—backed by serious enforcement 
penalties and a rights-protective ECJ—will in some ways create a 
complementary relationship between individual rights enforcement and 
collaborative governance. As companies fear both lawsuits425 and 
investigations sparked by individual complaints,426 they may be more likely 
to come together with regulators to help to define what is and is not feasible 
in their particular sector. 
For example, a company that fears being fined for failing to put in place 
suitable safeguards in automated decision-making is more likely to negotiate 
a code of conduct or put in place compliance procedures and infrastructure 
(for example, audits, DPOs, impact assessments, and so forth) that match the 
Guideline suggestions, in order to credibly argue that it is in compliance. 
Individual litigants enforcing their individual rights can, thus, serve as a 
penalty default, a credible threat that will drive companies to collaborate and 
negotiate. By participating in collaborative governance, companies can 
effectively help to create their own safe harbors from the GDPR’s extensive 
regime of individual rights. 
The GDPR’s system of individual rights can relatedly complement its 
collaborative regime by spreading the cost of compliance from the 
government to individual actors and their delegated NGOs. Cost is a huge 
problem for the GDPR. Audits will be expensive, and someone will have to 
pay for them or determine a system of reputational benefits to incentivize 
algorithmic auditing.427 Bringing technical expertise into the government 
will be expensive. Monitoring companies will be expensive. If the backstop 
of the GDPR’s system of collaborative governance of algorithms is the 
government, the government must be well resourced—and it is far from clear 
 
 425. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 79, at 80. 
 426. See id. art 77, at 80. 
 427. Thanks to Natali Helberger for this point. 
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that it will be.428 This means that individual rights bearers and their proxies 
may have to do a good deal of monitoring and even enforcement work—
including by invoking judicial remedies when regulators fail to act.429 
The GDPR’s system of individual rights will in some cases make 
instrumental contributions that will also serve the goals of its collaborative 
regime. The individual right of correction, for example, may help make 
algorithmic decision-making systems less erroneous, by correcting incorrect 
facts and inferences. Making the right of correction an individual right puts 
correction in the hands of the least cost avoider—the people who best know 
what information is correct about themselves. Other individual rights—of 
access and notification, for example—may help address other systemic 
problems, such as discrimination, by revealing individual instances of 
unjustifiable decision-making. 
Individual transparency rights can also be an important component of 
structured accountability in collaborative governance. This is important 
especially if regulators do not otherwise address the lack of third-party and 
public accountability mechanisms in the GDPR. If aggregated by third 
parties—the media or civil society—individual stories can trigger soft 
accountability mechanisms, like market responses or naming-and-shaming. 
The question is whether the individual transparency produced in the GDPR’s 
individual rights vindication provisions will be adequate to serve those 
functions in its collaborative governance regime. 
Similarly, the GDPR’s individual due process rights can function as a 
component of structured accountability for purposes of collaborative 
governance. By allowing individuals to challenge individual algorithmic 
decisions, the GDPR potentially makes companies accountable to an 
external force. How useful this is will depend a great deal on how substantive 
Article 22’s right to contest an algorithmic decision ends up being in 
practice. 
The GDPR’s collaborative regime may, conversely, strengthen its 
individual rights regime. First, collaborative approaches may lead to more 
effective systemic accountability, by imposing audits and third-party 
oversight rather than relying on individual challenges alone. This may, if it 
 
 428. Matt Reynolds, Lords AI Report Warns of ‘Big Five’ Data Grabs and Ethical Failures, 
WIRED (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/house-of-lords-artificial-intelligence-report-
ethics-monopolies (quoting Michael Veale: “With those bodies, you wonder if they’re spreading too 
thinly.”). 
 429. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, arts. 78–79, at 80 (providing individuals a right 
to lodge a complaint against a supervisory authority and a right to judicial remedies generally). 
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works, create better systemic protection of individuals’ rights, without the 
cost of constant individual challenges. 
Second, collaborative governance will in fact give substance to 
individual rights—and this may in places be a good thing. By using 
collaborative governance, the GDPR may end up creating more workable 
solutions, rather than solutions that look good on paper but do not function 
in reality. For example, the requirement that companies build products with 
individual rights in mind from the onset—data protection by design and by 
default—is textually broad or even without substance. Over time and 
collaboration, however, companies and standards bodies may in 
conversation with regulators be able to come up with workable and concrete 
requirements that will apply to protect everyone and not rely on individuals’ 
capacity to withhold consent or raise challenges. 
2.  Where the Two Prongs Are in Tension 
The GDPR’s dual systems of individual rights and collaborative 
governance will also, however, run into tension with each other. Some of the 
same features that could be complementary may also end up creating conflict 
between the two systems. How or whether these tensions will be resolved is 
a story that will play out over time and court decisions. 
Structurally the hard-law nature of the GDPR could create problems for 
its envisioned collaborative relationships. One aspect of the collaborative 
governance toolkit—known as “responsive regulation”—is that regulators 
be able to graduate their responses to violations in order to incentivize and 
encourage good faith behavior by companies.430 Under the GDPR’s new 
system of administrative fines, there may still be room for this kind of 
calibrated reaction.431 But the rights provided to individuals—including the 
right to a judicial remedy against government actors for nonaction and the 
right to a judicial remedy against a company directly432—will create 
penalties even when regulators choose not to act and may push regulators 
towards implementing harsher penalties or towards more investigations to 
begin with.433 While from an individual rights perspective this is a good 
 
 430. McGeveran, supra note 136, at 979–88. 
 431. Id. at 1019 (citing Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 83, at 82–83) (discussing 
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 433. Id. art. 78(2), at 80 (providing a right to judicial remedy “where the supervisory authority which 
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thing, it may from a collaborative governance perspective make it less 
possible for regulators to create safe-harbor-like rewards for collaborating 
companies and thus lead to lower degrees of voluntary collaboration. 
The GDPR’s system of strong individual rights may, too, favor 
individuals at the cost of correcting systemic problems, running counter to 
the instrumental goals of its collaborative governance system. Allowing 
individual correction and deletion can lead to gaming, which can distort the 
data set and the algorithm.434 Even when done in good faith, individual 
correction and deletion can make an overall decision-making system less 
accurate (if individuals take themselves out of the data pool), less fair (as it 
skews the data set), and even discriminatory (reflecting access to justice 
rather than fact). The same is true of the right to human intervention in the 
case of algorithmic decision-making—it may be the case that adding a 
human in the loop will respect individual dignity but could make accuracy 
of the overall system worse, thus negatively impacting other individuals 
subject to the algorithm. 
The debate over the right to explanation reveals another tension: that 
the kind of transparency that is necessary for one part of the system 
(individual rights) may not be adequate for the other (collaborative 
governance). Under the GDPR, individual transparency is intended to be 
understandable to and actionable by individuals.435 That makes it less useful 
for other kinds of oversight, including expert oversight. The kind of 
information that individuals need to make choices and invoke their 
respective rights is not the same as the kind of information that experts need 
to assess whether an algorithmic decision-making system is functioning 
correctly. But making individualized transparency more useful to experts 
may make it less useful to individuals. 
Individual rights also run in tension with efforts to solve the 
accountability gap in the GDPR’s collaborative regime, by releasing more 
information to the general public. If we attempt to solve the GDPR’s 
accountability gaps by increasing public transparency, we risk exposing 
more individuals’ information and threatening individual privacy. Even if 
we increase structured accountability by adding in layers of third-party 
oversight, that comes at the cost of distributing personal information to more 
parties. 
Perhaps the biggest source of tension between the two systems, 
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however, is the tension that arises over trying to constitute individual rights 
through a collaborative regime. The GDPR is aimed at protecting 
fundamental rights. Yet, its requirements are largely given substance in 
collaboration with private companies. The question in the EU is particularly 
loaded because of the fundamental rights backdrop to the GDPR regime: Is 
it appropriate to use collaborative governance to constitute fundamental 
individual rights?436 
Private companies are not reliable rights guardians, and their interests 
often misalign with the interests of individuals. The privatization of 
fundamental rights protection is prevalent throughout the GDPR. It is not 
just that companies are charged with protecting the rights of citizens.437 It is 
that companies are charged with codetermining with the government the 
actual content of rights.438 There is a substantial question of whether the ECJ, 
given its recent attention to data privacy, will find the GDPR’s collaborative 
approach to be adequately protective of fundamental rights.439 Alternatively, 
recent case law suggests the ECJ may end up functioning as an aspect of the 
collaborative regime, constraining companies’ behavior but still buying in to 
company participation in determining how fundamental rights are 
implemented in specific contexts.440 
CONCLUSION 
Governing algorithmic decision-making is hard. The technology is 
complex and opaque and a fast-moving target. But in significant part, solving 
the governance problem is hard because we cannot agree on why to regulate. 
A growing literature now focuses on regulating algorithmic decision-making 
in order to solve problems such as error, bias, and discrimination, but ignores 
or brushes over legitimate dignitary and justificatory reasons for regulating. 
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The law’s role is not just instrumental; it legitimizes and delegitimizes, 
validates or invalidates other decisional systems, and protects individual 
rights even against private actors. 
To serve all three goals, I propose a binary approach to algorithmic 
accountability that couples individual rights with systemic collaborative 
governance. The EU’s GDPR, at least on paper, comes close to realizing 
such a regime. The GDPR reveals, however, that in building a dual system 
we must constantly evaluate the role of a particular tool in both systems. 
The devil, as always, will be in the details: creating the right balance 
between hard law and soft, between flexibility and accountability, between 
bounded rights and room for private innovation. But binary governance is 
the scaffolding on which those details should be built. If we take only an 
individual rights approach, we risk failing to correct serious systemic 
problems with algorithmic decision-making. If we take only a systemic 
approach, we disregard real concerns about dignity and justification in such 
systems. The future of good algorithmic governance is a binary system of 
governance—one that may slide more towards one pole or the other, 
depending on the subsector-specific features or consequences of a particular 
type of decision—but one that addresses dignity and autonomy, systemic and 
individual legitimacy concerns, in addition to error and bias in algorithmic 
decision-making. 
 
